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N 1605 Don Quixote de la Mancha rode forth from the pages of
Cervantes' classic book to do battle against all wrong. He fancied
himself a grand knight in shining armor whose self-appointed quest
was to seek out the destroyer, end tyranny, and bring justice to the
weak and the oppressed. His thirst to conquer the foe soon set him
tilting at a giant knight who proved to be a windmill and then pitted
his prowess against a great army which was only a flock of sheep.
His goals may have been admirable, but his lack of contact with
reality doomed him to defeat from the start.
Today a new knight is setting out on much the same mission.
This present day defender of the public, the ombudsman, has not
cast himself in the ancient quixotic mold. He is a concept which
citizens throughout the world' have conjured up from enthusiastic
reports from Scandinavia.' The people would dub the ombudsman
their champion and send him forth to battle every official wrong.
They want him as a means of satisfying their need for a sense of
personal importance in the vastness and the facelessness of bureau-
cracy. They have romanticized the ideals inherent in the office into
a fantasy that does not exist;' the ombudsman they see is a panacea
for most of the shortcomings of the modern administrative system.4
As agency control over the lives of people grows more pervasive,
their demand for relief from governmental red tape becomes more
audible and their infatuation for this hero becomes more clear. In
response, a bevy of nations, including the United States and its state
and local governments, have recently begun considering transplanting
1 Bainbridge, A Civilized Thing, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 1965, at 136, reprinted in
Hearings on S. Res. 190 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings]; Kastari, Finland's Guardians of the Law, in
THE OMBUDSMAN 58 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
2 W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 5-6, 239 (1967); Krislov, A Restrained
View, in THE OMBUDSMAN 246, 247 '(D. Rowat ed. 1965); e.g., Asher, Ombuds-
man (Mr. Fixit) Here to Explain Unique System, Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1966,
reprinted in 1966 Hearings 28; see Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman,
11 Am. J. CoMP. L. 225 (1962), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 96.
3
See W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 195 (1967). This development has
been referred to affectionately as "ombudsmania." Marshall, The United Kingdom,
in THE OMBUDSMAN 173 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
4 A Pattern of Executive Protection: The Ombudsman, address by Hans Blix, at How-
ard University School of Law, Feb. 21, 1965, reprinted in 1966 Hearings 90.
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this ancient Nordic institution to their shores.' At least two Ameri-
can governments, Hawaii6 and Nassau County, New York,' have
adopted the idea, and others seem destined to follow suit. Whether
this American experiment will fulfill the public's high expecta-
tions or whether it will prove to be only a quixotic exercise remains
to be seen.
Colorado, having docketed an ombudsman bill in both houses
during the 1967 legislative session and having an unofficial and
voluntary ombudsman in the person of Lieutenant Governor Mark
Hogan, may count itself in the forefront of the American govern-
ments which have seriously considered the ombudsman idea. The
Lieutenant Governor has done more than anyone else to spark in-
terest among the people of the state. Shortly after taking office in
January 1967, Mr. Hogan announced that he intended to assume
the role of ombudsman for Colorado.' The public has taken ad-
vantage of his offer, and requests for his aid are increasing as pub-
licity about his work mounts. The local newspapers have added to
the interest by carrying on a lively debate over the merits of the
concept. The question which this situation presents to Coloradans
is whether the institution should be given formal status by the enact-
ment of an ombudsman bill at some future date.
Intelligent consideration whether this foreign institution has
any value for Colorado must be founded on a good understanding
of what the institution involves. The theory is simple: an ombuds-
man is a government official appointed to receive and investigate
complaints made by individuals against abusive or capricious acts of
public officials. If he finds the complaint is justified, he tries to
correct the action. He cannot reverse the official decision, but he
does try to persuade the agency to change its ways. He can often
influence a reluctant agency to adopt his recommendation by pub-
lishing his own opinion in the news media to bring public pressure
to bear.
Although the theory is simple, the ramifications are complex.
A good deal of information should be considered before any con-
clusions are reached about Lieutenant Governor Hogan's ombuds-
man work or about the ombudsman bills proposed for Colorado.
The Colorado situation can be better evaluated after viewing the
ombudsman institution in its historical setting and after analyzing
5 Anderman, supra note 2; Krislov, supra note 2, at 246-47.
6 10 STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, July 1967, at 7.
7 County Executive of Nassau County, N.Y., Press Release, May 31, 1966. See also N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 1, at 53, col. 1. The County Executive presented a proposed
local law to the Board of Supervisors which would create the office of Public Pro-
tector. On the same day he appointed the Commissioner of Accounts to assume the
powers and duties detailed in the proposal. The Board has not yet submitted the bill
to the people on referendum.
8 Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 12, 1967, at 23, col. 1.
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its strengths and weaknesses as revealed by the existing ombuds-
-man systems in other countries. Then this institution which de-
veloped within a parliamentary, civil law form of government must
be measured against the unique aspects of our congressional, com-
mon law system.
Reports of the detailed workings of most of the present om-
budsman offices have been published by competent authors. That
material will not be repeated here except to the extent necessary to
give a glimpse of how the office has traditionally functioned and
to show what results have been achieved. The parts of this article
which deal with specific facts and statistics recorded in the om-
budsman countries are drawn in large part from the first hand
reports written by Professor Walter Gellhorn and collected in his
excel!ent book, Ombudsmen and Othersf
I. THE SWEDISH INSTITUTION
The ombudsman concept is a product of monarchial Sweden.1 °
The direct predecessor of the present Ombudsman 1 came onto being
in 1713 during Sweden's war with Russia under Czar Peter I. After
twelve years of absence from the country as Commander-in-Chief
of his army, Sweden's King Charles XII found himself unable to
dispense enlightened justice or to assure himself that his servants
were faithfully carrying out the law. Therefore, he made a decision
which was to prove fateful for modern administrative government.
He appointed the King's Supreme Ombudsman to oversee the tax
collectors, the judges, and the handful of public servants who ad-
ministered the law in his name.' 2 The Swedish of today have praised
his decision," but it is likely he was motivated more by a desire
to insure himself against embezzlement than by a desire to protect
his people against oppression.1
4
The temporary appointment became a permanent part of the
9 W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1967) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN].
10 It is noteworthy that the office was created by an absolute monarch, since American
critics have attacked the idea as part and parcel of "creeping socialism." Unruh, The
Need for an Ombudsman in California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1965).
11 "Ombudsman" is an early Swedish term composed of three syllables. "Om" trans-
lates as about, "bud" means message, and "man" is person. Thus the literal transla-
tion is "man with a message about something." Fowle, Two Ombudsmen Report on
Roles-Civic Control Described by Swede and New Zealander, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1966, § 1, at 20, col. 1, reprinted in 1966 Hearings 380. In Swedish idiom the term
more accurately means a 'person who represents someone." Address by Blix, supra
note 4, at 93.
12 GELLHORuJ, supra note 9, at 194-95; Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of the Justi-
tieombudsman, 27 INT'L REV. AD. SCI. 243 (1961), reprinted in 1966 Hearings
77-78; address by Blix, supra note 4, at 93; Rudholm, The Chancellor of Justice, in
THE OMBUDSMAN 17-18 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
13 See, e.g., Bexelius, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 22, 25
(D. Rowat ed. 1965).
14 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 2.
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royal government. After the death of Charles XII the officer became
known as the Chancellor of Justice. In 1766 when Sweden's Parlia-
ment, the Riksdag, had gained the balance of power, it appropriated
the right to appoint the Chancellor. Later when the winds of political
fortune reversed, the new King reasserted the monarchial authority
and made the Chancellor the Crown's officer once more. Then in
1809 while the nation was again at war with Russia and engulfed
in national and international crises, the Riksdag led Sweden away
from royal government toward representative democracy. The Con-
stitution which was drafted and adopted by the Riksdag gave it
many new powers to offset the great authority of the King. One
brief clause created the office of Justitieombudsman as a safeguard
against disregard of the law by royal officers. The King had his
Chancellor of Justice to watch the civil service; now the Riksdag
had its own inspector of courts and administrative agencies, the
Ombudsman. 5
A. Results in Sweden
These developments in Sweden in 1809 launched the revolution-
ary idea of an official critic of government. The institution has
flourished there, and after more than one hundred and fifty years
the tradition permeates the thinking of the Swedish people. 6
With only a few assistants and a present annual budget of
$120,000,'7 the Ombudsman has carved a permanent niche in Swed-
ish life and has exerted a definitely beneficial influence on the
quality of its government.' The Ombudsman has been particularly
effective in protecting the civil rights of citizens, e.g., the rights of
peaceful assembly, free speech, and access to all official documents.
The liberties of the citizens have been safeguarded against encroach-
ment by the judiciary, the prosecutors, the police, and the penal
institutions. While success in checking administrative agency dere-
lictions has been less noteworthy, 9 the results have been impressive,
15 Authorities cited note 12 supra.
16 Anderman, supra note 2, at 237-38, 1966 Hearings at 105-06.
17 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 142, 1966 Hearings at 108. The staff consists of nine
lawyers and three secretaries.
IgAnderman, supra note 2, at 234-35, 1966 Hearings at 102-03. -i[F]ew would deny
that the Ombudsman institution has in its various forms achieved much good in
those countries where it exists." Mitchell, The Irrelevance of the Ombudsman Pro-
posals, in THE OMBUDSMAN 273 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
19 Anderman, supra note 2, at 235-37, 1966 Hearings at 103-05. There are special fac-
tors which have hindered progress in this field. The administrative branch of govern-
ment is expanding rapidly without an increase in the staff available, or a decrease in
other responsibilities. The agencies usually do not explain their decisions. There is
no administrative procedure act, and furthermore, neither the courts nor the Ombuds-
man can easily determine their jurisdiction over administrative decisions. The insti-
tution is presently shifting focus from supervision of the judiciary to supervision of
administration, and the transition is not complete. It has been suggested that a
country with a more highly developed system of judicial review would not experience
these difficulties because jurisdiction could be more clearly defined. Id.
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especially in achieving uniformity of procedure and uniformity of
interpretation. 0 It is as legislative reformer that the Ombudsman
has made little progress. His proposals to Parliament for statutory
change have largely been ignored although his annual reports to
Parliament and his petitions to the executive branch continue to
repeat his advice on matters in the expectation that his suggestions
will eventually prevail.
2 '
The influence of the Ombudsman does not result from the
few constitutional powers he is given. It stems from his position
as the trustee of Parliament, and from the tremendous prestige the
office has accumulated over the century and a half of its existence.
His carefully reasoned arguments made from this respected position
are usually sufficient to persuade an official, if not the Parliament,
to accept his suggestion. These factors are the source of his in-
fluence, and the press is the means by which it is maintained and
disseminated.2
The Swedish would be the first to admit that their Ombudsman
is not a single handed miracle worker. There have been no sensa-
tional disclosures of scandal on a national level. In fact, very few
of the cases have been remarkable, but that has not detracted from
their importance to the individuals involved.
23
The first Ombudsman corrected the most spectacular abuses
which have been discovered. On one inspection in 1825 of a debtors'
prison at Stockholm, the Ombudsman found an unfortunate brewer
who had been imprisoned for twenty-two years waiting for the
Supreme Court to decide his appeal. The Court had mislaid his
file! The executive branch was moved to release the man without
any further penalty.24
A more typical example of recent years resulted in standardiza-
tion of agency procedure. Swedish law authorizes county adminis-
trators to revoke driving licenses on evidence that the holder does
not meet the standards of skill, responsibility or reliability required
of a driver. The Ombudsman's investigation into revocation pro-
cedures showed that various administrations employed widely dif-
ferent standards. Some revoked the driving licenses of persons for
20 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 240.
21 Id. at 244-46.
22 See Bexelius, supra note 13, at 25; Anderman, supra note 2, at 225, 1966 Hearings
at 96; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 138, 142, 1966 Hearings at 107-08. "[Tlhe
Ombudsman's finding fault causes some temporary pain and perhaps some loss of
self-esteem in most instances, but . . . it rarely leaves permanent scars if the offense
was not willful. . . . A headline saying the Ombudsman has criticized the police is
almost the equivalent of a prosecution." GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 249-50. The
individual's career is not lost because his superiors may choose to ignore the incident
in favor of the rest of his record when promotions are considered.
23 Bexelius, supra note 13, at 36-37.
2 Id. at 38.
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drunkenness even though they had not been driving. Other adminis-
trations only revoked licenses after two or three cases of drunken-
ness. The Ombudsman's remarks were sufficient to cause each ad-
ministration to adopt the same revocation procedure.25
An examination of 400 cases involving driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol revealed that some courts had used incorrect
formulas to determine the alcohol content of the blood. Two out-
standing scientists were called upon to define a valid calculation.
Their information was passed along to the courts which were able
to increase accuracy and administer better justice.26
A man in a mental hospital wrote a letter complaining that one
of the doctors was opening his mail. The Ombudsman could only
reply that the doctor was authorized by law to do so.27
In another case, a band of gypsies set up camp on a beach in
a town. They were located on a public camping site so they refused
to leave when the local chief of police requested them to move on.
The next day the gypsies and their belongings were loaded onto a
police bus and dumped off in a desolate area. They asked the Om-
budsman to investigate. Since the gypsies had violated no law, the
police chief had acted illegally. The police chief was prosecuted
by the Ombudsman under the rarely used constitutional authoriza-
tion to prosecute officials who commit unlawful acts or who neglect
to perform their duties in the proper manner. The court found the
police chief guilty of the charge and assessed a fine. 8
The Ombudsman once read in a Stockholm newspaper of an
alcoholic who had killed his wife in a drunken rage. Four days
earlier she had asked the police for protection, insisting that her
husband was a dangerous alcoholic. The Ombudsman wrote to the
police and asked why they gave the lady no protection. They replied
that they had taken the man into custody at once, but had to release
him since the law did not allow detention of an alcoholic for more
than one day. During that day the police had not been able to
gather sufficient evidence to have him committed to an institution
for alcoholics. The police were exonerated, but the government was
moved to amend the law so as to authorize detention of a person
charged as a dangerous alcoholic for enough time to complete the
investigation.29
A statistical examination of the Swedish Ombudsman's efforts
gives another perspective of the work he and other ombudsmen do.
In 1964 the Ombudsman received 1,429 new cases. Of those, 1,239
21966 Hearings at 35-36.
2
6Id. at 36.
27 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 142, 1966 Hearings at 109.




were citizens' complaints, 179 were the result of his inspections or
other information, and eleven were initiated on his own motion on
the basis of newspaper reports.80 Although they comprise only
thirteen percent of his caseload, the Ombudsman thinks his inspec-
tions produce the most significant leads to administrative short-
comings. 31 About twenty percent of the private complaints come
from inmates of mental hospitals and penal institutions.8 2  About
thirty percent of the personal complaints are dismissed without an
inquiry. Approximately ninety percent of all investigated complaints
are dismissed after an examination of the relevant documents. All
complainants whose cases are dismissed receive a written explana-
tion of the dismissal.83 Only about ten percent of all complaints are
determined by the Ombudsman to be justified.
34
B. Adoption of the Swedish Institution Elsewhere
In spite of its longstanding acclaim in Sweden, it is only within
the last two decades that the ombudsman institution has gained
much recognition elsewhere."n Finland is the one exception; her
historical links with Sweden caused Finland to create an Ombudsman
office in 1919.36
Denmark generated the current worldwide interest by installing
an ombudsman for civil and military affairs in 1954." T The office
was adopted by West Germany in 1957,38 and then, in quickening
succession, by Norway and New Zealand in 1962.3
9
Guyana, a newly emerged nation state, created an ombudsman
office by its new constitution.40 Laval, Canada, a suburb of Quebec
City, became the first North American government to establish the
office by adopting its own version in January 1966.41 Nassau County,
New York, was the first United States government to have an om-
budsman. However, the office created there in May 1966 was insti-
tuted by executive order rather than by legislative enactment or by
30 GELLHORN, supra note 9, Table XII at 208.
31 Id. at 208.
32 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 142, 1966 Hearings at 109.
33 GELLHORN, supra note 9, Table XIV at 214; address by Blix, supra note 4, at 94.
34 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 213.
35 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 5; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 136, 1966 Hearings at
106.
36 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 48-50; Anderman, supra note 2, at 225, 1966 Hearings
at 96.
37 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 5-8; Northey, New Zealand's Parliamentary
Commissioner, in THE OMBUDSMAN 127, 131 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
38 Anderman, supra note 2, at 225, 1966 Hearings at 96-97.
39 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 154-59 (Norway); Northey, supra note 37, at 127
(New Zealand).
40 Gellhorn, Ombudsman in America?, TRIAL, Apr.-May 1967, at 38.
41 Cloward & Elman, Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State, An Ombudsman for the
Poor?, THE NATION, Feb. 28, 1966, at 230, 233.
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referendum of the people.4" Hawaii, in June 1967, became the first
of the states to enact an ombudsman bill. But that legislation re-
mains on the books, unconsummated, because the legislature did not
fill the office or provide a fund for its operation. 8
II. ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING OMBUDSMAN OFFICES
Each government which has transplanted the institution has
built on the original foundation, making adaptations to fit the
special needs of the adopting country. An examination of the
strengths and weaknesses which have been highlighted by the varia-
tions from Scandinavia to New Zealand reveals much about the
form the office should take. At the same time, the comparison gives
some indication of the success which could be expected in Colorado.
A. Qualifications
It may not be essential that an ombudsman be an attorney, but
legal training would be an important asset.. 4 While a good portion
of his work primarily requires common sense and an overall view
of the administrative system, there remains a substantial part of the
program which only an attorney is trained to handle. For example,
the ombudsman must provide expert investigation involving ques-
tions of law if the public, the agencies and the legislature are to be
influenced." The officer must be capable of demanding certain
standards of conduct from an agency and be capable of persuading
officials that the law requires no less.48 As another example, it is
highly unlikely that anyone other than an experienced attorney could
successfully argue that the case of SEC v. Chenery Corp.47 requires
42 Authorities and material cited note 7, supra.
43 10 STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, July 1967, at 7. See also Rocky Mountain News,
June 15, 1967, at 55, col. 1.
4See GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 422-23; cf. Aaron, Utah Ombudsman: The American
Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 32, 44.
5 Abrahamson, Ireland, in THE OMBUDSMAN 201, 204 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
46 See Abraham, The Need for an Ombudsman in the United States, in THE OMBUDS-
MAN 234, 236 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
47 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Many experienced attorneys will find this reading of the
second Chenery case startling. It is, however, an interpretation which has been made
by the respected Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association.
[T]he Chenery case is uniformly cited or miss-cited [sic] to support an
agency's election to proceed by ad hoc adjudication rather than by rule
making. Occasionally, as in the E & B Brewing case [NLRB v. E & B
Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 '(6th Cir. 1960)), it is cited as establishing
limitations upon retroactive application of standards established in such
adjudications. It has not been cited as establishing or suggesting, as it
does, standards for finding abuse of discretion in the persistent failure or
refusal of agencies to promulgate as rules those "rules of decision" which
have become hoary as "well established" precedents, sometimes followed
with stare decisis faithfulness.
Recommendations of Vice Chairman Smalley to the Committee on Agency Rule
Making, 12 AD. L. BULL. 190 (1960).
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the agency in a given situation to establish policy by published rules
rather than by ad hoc adjudication. It is doubtful that a non-legally
trained person could convincingly argue that an agency's denial of
an application for a license without following announced criteria
violates due process as defined in Hornsby v. Allen."' Moreover,
it is unlikely that case law arguments would even occur to someone
outside the legal profession.
The constitutional guarantees of the first eight amendments as
well as those of procedural and substantive due process have be-
come familiar terms to large numbers of the public. But whether
they have been violated is a question requiring legal skill, and safe-
guarding these guarantees has traditionally been treated as a legal
concern.
A large number of complaints force the investigator to con-
strue statutes, rules and opinions of courts and agencies. He must
be able to analyze legislative history when that is necessary to statu-
tory interpretation. He must be capable of suggesting reorganization
and delineation of responsibility among the various agencies. His
work as a legislative reformer means he must be adept at many
phases of law, from determining what reforms are necessary to per-
haps drafting the legislative revision.
The ombudsman's effectiveness can be bolstered if his opinion,
based on hindsight and expertise in administrative law, is convincing
on its merits.4 9 He cannot satisfy the complainant unless the indi-
vidual is assured the investigation was thorough and accurate. He
cannot effectively urge the legislature to revise without presenting
solid reasons for the change. He cannot persuade the agency to
adopt a new procedure without convincing it that the proffered
method is more sound administratively. In the final analysis, he
cannot be wrong often or he will not be able to influence anyone
that his opinions are reliable.
All these requirements do not mean, however, that legal train-
ing is an indispensable prerequisite to effectiveness as an ombuds-
man. It is commonplace for administrators and executives without
legal backgrounds to succeed. They must make many decisions in-
volving legal considerations, but they rely on advice from attorneys.
An ombudsman could do the same by making an attorney a member
of his staff. Nevertheless, legal training would relieve an ombuds-
man of the necessity of relying on another person's advice in many
matters. An ombudsman with a legal background would undoubtedly
- 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
49 W. GELIHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 229-30 (1966).
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have a valuable advantage; without it his efforts could be seriously
hampered.
The Scandinavian countries explicitly make legal education a
prerequisite, and Norway even requires that the ombudsman meet
the qualifications of a judge of its highest court.50 New Zealand
sets out no qualifications for its ombudsman,"' evidently trusting the
House of Representatives to select a suitable individual. The only
man appointed so far has been considered eminently qualified; he
was a successful lawyer before becoming an administrator and
diplomat.
52
Personal characteristics are probably the most important criteria
in the selection of an ombudsman. 3 His effectiveness rests upon
several highly significant but intangible characteristics: his person-
ality, his public image, his ability to communicate, his tenacity. 4 His
own integrity and objectivity must be beyond doubt; if they are not,
there is little that his criticism can do to effect changes or little that
his opinion can do to placate complainants.55 He must be self-
sufficient if he is to carry out his task in the face of the criticisms
that are sure to be made. He must be strong enough to criticize high
ranking officials when necessary, and courageous enough to take an
unpopular position. Above all, he must remain apart from partisan
politics to retain the confidence indispensable to his work."
The Danish Ombudsman, without trying, is the only official
critic around whom a personality cult has developed.57 While this
gives him great prestige and ability to persuade, it tends to transform
criticism of the man into criticism of the office. This development
is probably due to the selection of a highly popular and prominent
individual, and it is certainly fostered by what Professor Gellhom
describes as colorful and able performance.58
Most countries have tended to select someone who is relatively
unknown, perhaps to avoid choosing a political partisan. The Swed-
ish like to say, as one parliamentary leader expressed it, "The man
we select does not lend distinction to the office; the office distin-
guishes him."59 The Norwegians chose a judge from their Supreme
50 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 158.
51 Ombudsman Act § 2 (1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132.
52 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 92.
5
3 Id. at 423.
54 See Abraham, supra note 46, at 237.
5 W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 47 (1966).
56 Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 Amt. J. ComP. L. 225, 226 (1962),
reprinted in 1966 Hearings 96, 97.
57 GEILHORN, supra note 9, at 33-34.
58 Id. at 5 & n.1. Mr. Hurwitz was a law professor on the faculty of the University of
Copenhagen.
59 Id. at 203.
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Court to be their first Ombudsman.60 He has been described as a
modest and shy man who does not receive widespread press cover-
age. Even without news reports, his work has been effective due
mainly to dissemination of his opinions through specialized publi-
cations."'
On the other hand, the mildness of Finland's Ombudsman has
meant that the potentialities of the office have been only partly
realized. For example, while the Ombudsman agreed that local
officials had no authority to intrude into the private life of one
complainant, he did no more than that. He did not come to the
defense of each citizen's right to privacy by issuing a rebuke and
giving it widespread publicity. If he had, he might have been re-
sponsible for strengthening this right throughout the country.
6 2
Mr. Bexelius, the Swedish Ombudsman, furnishes a good ex-
ample of the attitude required. He has said:
[M]any of my friends have been angry with me. Often when I
criticize a judge, he is a man with whom I have worked in court
and know very, very well. Naturally, I don't like to criticize him,
but I must. The ombudsman cannot be concerned about his popu-
larity. It is no secret that high officials in Sweden - all of them -
dislike the ombudsman. They say that he is always interfering in
things he doesn't know anything about, and that they could do their
jobs better if he would stop meddling, and so on. But all their
grumbling doesn't mean a thing. Everybody knows that it is neces-
sary to have an ombudsman. 6 '
B. Method of Selection
The Swedish procedure of a non-partisan selection by the legis-
lative body has been widely followed. Since the ombudsman has
been conceived everywhere as the legislature's agent, that body nat-
urally exercises the prerogative of selection. Realizing that the om-
budsman's whole power depends upon his objectivity, most legisla-
tures have not succumbed to the temptation to make a partisan
choice.
6 4
The Swedish Parliament chooses a body of forty-eight electors
and empowers it to elect the Ombudsman. Seats on the electoral
body are proportionate to party representation in the Riksdag, twenty-
four members being chosen from each house. Since World War I
the elections have been unanimous. Pending elections have not re-
ceived much attention by the public or the press which presumably
leaves the electors free to choose a well qualified individual rather
60 Id. at 158.
61 Id. at 189-90.
62 Id. at 88-89.
3 Bainbridge, A Civilized Thing, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 1965, at 136, 151, reprinted
in 1966 Hearings 106, 112.
6GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 424.
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than a spokesman for the majority party. The tradition in Sweden
of selecting a jurist strengthens the absence of a choice based on
partisan considerations because the judiciary is removed from poli-
tical elections. 65 The ombudsmen of Denmark, Finland and Norway
are elected directly by their parliaments.66
New Zealand's method of selection is unique. The Ombuds-
man is appointed by the executive branch, but only upon the recom-
mendation of each Parliament. It is possible that the Government
can dictate the choice since it nominally controls the votes of its sup-
porters. This has not happened; New Zealand's election has fol-
lowed the non-partisan tradition firmly established in most of the
Scandinavian countries." It should be noted that the institution was
established in Sweden in an era when party politics in the modern
sense did not exist.6 The recent experience in Denmark and New
Zealand,6" however, is a strong indication that the office can be
transplanted into today's political atmosphere without loss of neu-
trality.
Finland is the exception to the tradition. Perhaps the injection
of partisan considerations into the selection accounts for the fact
that this ombudsman has less influence than those of other countries.
Each party nominates a candidate and the nominee of the majority
party is routinely elected. At least the procedure of voting by secret
ballot without discussion 0 avoids what otherwise could be irrep-
arable damage to the prestige of the individual and to his ability
to fulfill the task.
If the premise asserted here that the ombudsman must function
independently is accepted, then most considerations favor a non-
partisan selection, and little valid reason exists for a political choice.
Playing politics here is a two-edged sword. A sophisticated citizenry
might soon realize that the controlling party had not acted to help
and protect the public but rather to advance its own fortune by
entrenching a political hack in a powerful position to heap abuse
on the opposition and to make excuses for his own party. The tactic
could well cause an adverse reaction at the polls. Appreciation of
this possibility probably accounts for the fact that few legislatures
make a partisan choice.
65 See Lundvik, Comments on the Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN
44-45 (D. Rowat ed. 1965) ; GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 202-03.
66 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 424. The Finnish Parliament elects its Ombudsman by
a simple majority vote. Id. at 51.
67 Id. at 103-04.
68 Holmgren, The Need for an Ombudsman Too, in THE OMBUDSMAN 225, 230 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965).
69 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 103-04.
70 See generally id. at 424.
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C. Tenure, Salary and Staff
Sweden's experimentation with the most advantageous length
of term has provided a touchstone for others. Before 1941 Sweden's
Ombudsmen were elected for a one year term. Even though many
were re-elected the changeovers proved to be too frequent. At present
the Swedish Ombudsman serves a four year term, and his salary is
equal to that of a judge of the Supreme Court. He may be re-elected
indefinitely although indications are that Parliament considers twelve
years service the maximum. It deems a new officer with a fresh
outlook desirable. Parliament is also aware that the strain of the
responsibility might take its toll on any person's devotion and initia-
tive after many years in the office.
Although Parliament retains the power to remove the Ombuds-
man during the term for exceptional reasons, it has never done so. 7
Even failing at re-election the officer is not without security; he
may choose to resume his previous career or to retire on a full pen-
sion.72 The other Scandinavian countries allow each new parliament
to elect an ombudsman or to re-elect the incumbent. The New
Zealand Ombudsman serves until his successor has been appointed
by a succeeding Parliament.
Removal from office during the term is more difficult in New
Zealand than in most of the Scandinavian countries, although re-
moval has seldom occurred anywhere. The New Zealand Ombuds-
man can be removed or suspended only for disability, bankruptcy,
neglect of duty or misconduct.73 The Nordic parliaments can re-
move their appointee when a simple lack of confidence occurs.
A term of at least three or four years is necessary for the indi-
vidual to master the demands of the office, to establish rapport with
those he serves and for the public to realize full benefits. The notion
applied to the judiciary in some jurisdictions of insuring autonomy
by means of an appointment for life might unduly rigidify the insti-
tution while gaining an independence that most legislative bodies
are already willing to grant. An individual could lose both his
initiative and his flexibility after holding the office for a long time.
Further, there must be a hedge against loss of confidence by the
legislature, the agencies or the people. An ombudsman without
influence would be a lameduck appointee without effectiveness.74
If lengthy tenure is not a desirable feature, other aspects must
make the job appealing to attract highly qualified individuals to
71 See generally Lundvik, supra note 65, at 45. See also Bainbridge, supra note 63, at
140-42, 1966 Hearings at 108.
72 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 203; Lundvik, supra note 65, at 45.
73 Ombudsman Act § 5 '(1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132, 149.
74 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 425.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
this formidable task. The possibilities of future advancement in
public office are no longer much of an inducement. Even in Sweden
it is the practice to choose an older individual and to refrain from
appointing him to another office at the end of eight or twelve years
of service. He is then relieved of the economic need to curry favor
rather than criticizing forthrightly.75 This philosophy in altered
form has appeared in some of the ombudsmen bills proposed in
the United States. Most of the proposals bar any member of the
state legislature from holding the office within two years after
leaving the legislature.76 At the same time the proposals bar the
ombudsman from holding any state position for either two or three
years after he relinquishes that office.77
While these restrictions will be helpful in preventing the office
from being used as a reward for the faithful, but losing, political
candidate, or from being turned into a patronage post for a career
civil servant, they will also tend to limit the number of interested
applicants. To be barred from a public position for several years
after serving as ombudsman would seem to eliminate the career civil
servant. It could well eliminate judges, the class which has most
frequently filled the office elsewhere. There would be no guarantee
that these people could ever resume their careers in public service
after their terms as ombudsmen.
The American proposals would prevent the incumbent from
holding any position for remuneration during his tenure,78 but he
should be able to take a leave of absence from many vocations. The
latter factor should broaden the field of selection somewhat, even
if legal training is made a requisite. In that case, attorneys en-
gaged in private practice and law professors would be likely classes
to provide the ombudsman. However, the right individual could
come from the bench or the district attorney's office, or from any
legal background if he expected to retire at the end of his service.
In that event the restriction on employment after service would be
no hindrance.
Two factors which might cause a qualified individual to accept
the position are an adequate salary and a competent staff. An addi-
tional reason to set a high salary is to enhance its public image by
giving material recognition to the importance of the office. The
Scandinavian countries have fixed the salary at a level cormensurate
with that of a judge on the highest court, or equal to the chief
judge's compensation. Only in New Zealand is the salary left to
75 Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 140, 1966 Hearings at 108.





the discretion of the chief executive. The salary there has been
fixed below that of most of the higher judges and other ranking
officials.7"
The power to determine salary level can be important as a
control over the independence of the ombudsman. It can mean an
executive official, a legislative committee, or a legislature itself with
power to reduce the flow of funds during the ombudsman's term
can influence his work. The Scandinavian procedure which estab-
lishes the salary at a par with that of the judges of the supreme
courts is one solution to this problem.
It seems highly likely that the recurring governmental problem
of competing poorly with private business salaries will appear here.
The individuals who are qualified will likely be receiving compen-
sation at a rate well over what the government will pay. These
factors may be unimportant, however, since no country has experi-
enced difficulty in attracting able men to the post. The chance to
make a real contribution to a better life and the attendant prestige
are probably persuasive enough to cause many to accept the chal-
lenge in spite of the hardship it entails.
An ombudsman's work is invariably viewed as highly personal
since his own integrity and objectivity are the factors which make
his judgments effective. His effectiveness can be hampered if he
is not allowed to choose his own staff. It is essential that the assist-
ants who will do much of his research have his confidence. All of
the countries which have an ombudsman allow him to select his
own assistants. Several of them, however, select a deputy ombuds-
man in the same manner as his superior is chosen to assist and to
fill a vacancy.8"
One engaging feature of the institution is the small staff with
which it has traditionally functioned. The Danish staff consists of
seven lawyers and five clerical employees. Most of them work only
part time because their services as attorneys are in great demand in
private practice. Yet they consider working with the Ombudsman
desirable employment because many have been able to advance to
good positions after their broad exposure to governmental activities.81
Sweden's Ombudsman operates with a staff of nine attorneys
and three secretaries.8 2  The New Zealand staff consists of a law-
yer, an administrator, an investigating officer and two clerical em-
ployees. Another attorney and another typist also work part time.8"
9 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 425.
80Id. at 425-26.
81 Id. at 29.
82 Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 142, 1966 Hearings at 108.
83 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 116 & n.56.
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These staffs are not large considering the populations they
serve. Sweden, the most populous of the Scandinavian countries,
counts eight million people.8 4 New Zealand has a population of
three million people.85 It is encouraging to note that no ombudsman
has been denied the staff he needs, nor has had difficulty in re-
cruiting qualified persons.86
D. jurisdictional Powers
Limiting the jurisdictional reach of the ombudsman has been
one of the most difficult problems encountered. An ombudsman
cannot revise the entire governmental framework let alone function
as a superior administrative authority for each agency. He cannot
be made competent to examine every public problem, but the diffi-
culty lies in where and how to draw the line. No matter how juris-
diction has been defined, it is characteristic of each ombudsman
office that much time and effort has been required to determine
whether a particular matter falls within its scope.87
No ombudsman has been empowered to supervise the work of
the legislature which, after all, created the office to assist it and
not to govern it. Yet the responsibility to criticize inadequate laws
and to recommend revision amounts to an indirect supervision of
the legislature. Still, an ombudsman has no formal sanctions to
compel the adoption of his suggestions for legislative reform, just
as he is given no formal power to effect his other suggestions.
The Danish Ombudsman is authorized to supervise some local
matters and every phase of national administration, military and
civil, excluding the courts. His jurisdiction encompasses "ministers,
civil servants and all other persons acting in the service of the State"
except those who work in judicial administration.8" Even with this
wide jurisdiction the Ombudsman has sought to enlarge his juris-
diction. In 1964 he took cognizance of complaints against lawyers
appointed by the national government whose indigent clients were
dissatisfied. He felt these attorneys were within his reach as "persons
acting in the service of the State." In fact, he astounded the entire
profession by intimating that lawyers should be within his jurisdic-
tion because they perform a public function and can only serve when
duly licensed by the state. The issue has not been finally settled
84 The Swedish government estimated the population at 7,773,000 in 1966. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS FOR 1967, at 258.
8 The New Zealand government officially estimated the population at 2,647,282 in
1965. Id. at 258.
86 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 426. But the rapidly increasing backlog of cases in the
Swedish office indicates that this ombudsman staff is reaching the limit of its capa-
bility to handle the increasing volume of cases. Text accompanying note 106 intra.
87 See generally id. at 426-27.
88 id. at 10-11.
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although the bar association persuaded him to disclaim a present
competence."9
New Zealand's experience is informative. Its statute states that
the principal function of the Ombudsmen is to "investigate any de-
cision or recommendation made . . or any act done or omitted,
relating to any matter of administration and affecting any person
or body of persons in his or its personal capacity."' A schedule
lists those departments which are placed by statute within the Om-
budsman's jurisdiction, but that does not solve the problem. The
Ombudsman has the difficult task of deciding whether an act re-
lates to what the statute terms a "matter of administration" over
which he has jurisdiction or to a matter of policy over which he does
not. The Ombudsman has not been able to devise any general prin-
ciples which resolve the problem so he is forced to decide his juris-
diction case by case. His decisions have sometimes been strongly
criticized, his detractors fearing that he is extending his jurisdictional
reach into policy decisions.9 The New Zealand Ombudsman has
stated that a quarter of his working time is taken in resolving his
own doubts about jurisdiction.92
1. Review of Discretion
The Swedish institution was originally charged with the re-
sponsibility of insuring compliance by public officials with laws and
regulations. It gradually assumed the additional duty of reviewing
administrative decisions, not so much to change the result of the
case at hand but to insure other cases are properly considered.9"
Traditionally an ombudsman does not criticize simply because he
would have reached a different decision but only if the action under
review is so clearly erroneous as to be illegal. Discretion is only
abused where there are no valid reasons for the way it is exercised,
that is, where the controlling reasons are arbitrary or capricious.
Yet this distinction is notoriously difficult for the courts or the
ombudsman to draw in practice.
The New Zealand statute allows the widest latitude for ignor-
ing the distinction. The Ombudsman may review an administrative
decision not only for illegality, but to determine whether it is "un-
89 Id. at 43. The Scandinavian countries do not have a declaratory judgment procedure
which could provide a definite answer to disputes such as this. E.g., Lundvik, Com-
ments on the Ombudsman for Civil A/airs, in THE OMBurDSMAN 44, 46-47 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965). This article also includes a discussion of the difficulties caused by
this lack.
9 0 Ombudsman Act § 11 (1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132, 136.
91 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 107, 110.
9
2 Id. at 118.
93 The Office of Ombudsman in New Zealand- Its Origin and Operation, address by




reasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory," or "was
based . . . on a mistake of law or fact," or "was wrong." 94 The
statute in effect opens the door to review of all decisions, discre-
tionary or otherwise, and the present Ombudsman has seized the
opportunity to do so."
Other countries try to restrain their critic more closely. Norway
allows review and criticism when the decision is "found to be clearly
unreasonable or otherwise clearly in conflict with fair administra-
tive practice."9" Yet the Ombudsman has found it proper to con-
sider more and more of the borderline cases, and Professor Gellhorn
concludes he has acted on many complaints which are outside his
jurisdiction since there was no clear abuse of discretion.97
The Danish statute provides that the Ombudsman is to "keep
himself informed" whether those subject to his supervision "commit
mistakes or acts of negligence in the performance of their duties."
The Parliament's general directives expand on this by directing
criticism of "arbitrary or unreasonable decisions."98
The actual practice of ombudsmen to assume wide jurisdiction
over matters of discretion is clearly apparent.99 The statutory defini-
tions may be different semantically, but in practice there is no dis-
tinction between an "unreasonable" decision and a "clearly unrea-
sonable" decision. Language will probably never be adequate to
control the extent of an ombudsman's assertion of his jurisdiction.
It seems that the only effective check will be supervision by the
legislative committee which is commonly charged with responsibility
to oversee the ombudsman's work.' 0
2. Exhaustion of Remedies
One of the controversial issues is whether the doctrine of ex-
haustion of remedies should be applied to the ombudsman. Theo-
retically, the citizen has enough protection if he has a right of
appeal to any court or administrative tribunal. There should be no
need for a second review by the ombudsman; a fully adjudicated
decision is supposed to be better justice than that which the om-
9 4 Ombudsman Act § 19 (1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132, 143.
95 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 433-34.
96 Id. at 168.
97 Id. at 169-70.
98 Id. at 13 & n.15.
99 Id. at 434.
10 Sweden's system of parliamentary supervision of the ombudsman is typical of that
used by other countries. The First Law Committee of the Riksdag is charged with
maintaining a working relationship between the Riksdag and the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman's required annual report of his work is addressed to that committee. The
committee receives any complaints made about his activities, and its members may
criticize his past decisions or suggest he concentrate his energies in a different area.




budsman can offer. If the issue is the substantive soundness of a
decision affecting a private interest, the tribunal is probably best
qualified to consider the merits. But if the complaint relates to
procedure, arbitrariness, behavior or issues other than the merits,
the ombudsman is better equipped to give a decision.' 01
Ideally the ombudsman should be free to cut across the bureau-
cratic structure to get at the crux of the complaint. If he is able to
do so, however, many complainants will come directly to him rather
than pursue the elaborate and expensive review structure that is
available. The advantage to the individual is that the ombudsman
will take the case upon himself without any further effort or ex-
pense of the individual. On the other hand, the ombudsman has
no power to change a decision even though his suggestions or criti-
cisms often achieve that result for the individual.
Furthermore, if the doctrine is applicable many meritorious
complaints will never be appealed to the administrative tribunal
much less reach the courts. The citizen is often thoroughly exhausted
in finances and patience before he has exhausted the administrative
remedies which stand between him and court review. Even if direct
access to the court were granted, many individuals could not afford
it, nor would they choose to accept it. The right to appeal is fre-
quently not exercised.
There are arguments to be made for or against applying the
exhaustion doctrine. Seeking the middle ground by leaving the mat-
ter to the discretion of the ombudsman affords no clear solution.
Norway's Ombudsman is instructed by Parliament to require that a
complainant pursue the administrative relief available unless "par-
ticular reasons" exist for assuming jurisdiction at once. Where
administrative review remains open he has dealt with the merits in
only two situations. One is when the complaint is clearly unjustified
so that no good purpose could be served by requiring appeal before
giving his opinion. The second is when the matter is too urgent
to insist on following the appeal available. But even this Ombuds-
man is an example of the trend among official critics to assume
jurisdiction even if other avenues remain open to the complainant.
The Norwegian Ombudsman has managed to exert his influence
without taking actual jurisdiction. For instance, he advised a pris-
oner to complain through channels, but at the same time he com-
municated informally with the Ministry of Justice to ask about some
of the points of the complaint. This technique gives the department
a clear indication of the Ombudsman's opinion even when he tech-
nically has not acted on the case.' 02
101 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 110-11.
102 Id. at 172 & n.36.
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The Swedish Ombudsman, whose jurisdiction is not limited by
the exhaustion doctrine, affords another example of the tendency
to assume jurisdiction rather than to turn a complainant away. On
occasion a case has been appealed to the ministerial body and simul-
taneously filed with the Ombudsman. In that situation the ministers
have tended to wait for the Ombudsman to act, and he has waited
for the ministers to act. But the Ombudsman admits that he has
usually given in first and assumed jurisdiction.1
0
3
Other countries have resolved the question by statute in favor
of a flat requirement of exhaustion of remedies.1'0 The decisive
factor is probably that, with any other rule, the ombudsman and
his small staff would be inundated with more than he could handle.
Even the Swedish Ombudsman has suggested that the doctrine be
made applicable to him. 105 His backlog of cases almost doubled
from 240 in 1961 to 447 in 1965, and this no doubt accounts for
his recommendation.
10 6
3. Statute of Limitations
Complaints are almost always filed when the matter is current,
but exceptions do occur, necessitating a statute of limitations to
establish a time limit after which an ombudsman no longer has
jurisdiction. A complaint is considered valid in Sweden even if it
is lodged ten years after the event. Other countries draw the line
at one year to avoid airing ancient grudges and to limit complaints
to those suitable for investigation.0 7
The shorter period has most of the arguments on its side.
There is some reason to give the ombudsman authority to bypass
the one year statute of limitations to pursue a meritorious case, but in
the instances already discussed where an ombudsman has been given
discretion, he has tended to expand his jurisdiction. Unlimited juris-
diction can create an unworkable situation, and it would seem best to
foreclose that possibility with a mandatory statute of limitations.
E. Source and Processing of the Ombudsman's Work
The manner in which the ombudsman institution is called into
operatioh is important to its effectiveness. Matters are brought to
an ombudsman's attention in several ways. Any citizen may write
to lodge a complaint.' 0 In addition, ombudsmen often investigate
103 Id. at 207 & n.23.
104 See generally id. at 428.
105 Id. at 207 & n.23.
106 Id. at 213.
107 Id. at 427.
10 See generally id. at 210-17; Bexelius, supra note 13, at 28; address by Blix, supra
note 4, at 93.
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questionable decisions or practices brought to their attention by the
news media.'0 9 They may also seek out administrative abuse through
inspections of agencies."' The real value of the institution as far
as the public is concerned is direct and easy access to the service
by means of a personal complaint."' The complainant need do no
more. The ombudsman will decide whether to pursue the matter
and he will conduct any investigation. While the Swedish Ombuds-
man feels that matters which he takes up on his own motion as a
result of a news item or his inspection result in the most productive
work," 2 other ombudsmen have ignored their inspection and self-
initiated powers and have concentrated on individual complaints."
The authority to act by any of the three methods is a power which
each ombudsman should be allowed to develop as he chooses.
1. Complaints
Complaints filed by letter with the ombudsman, either from an
individual or an organization, constitute the bulk of his work. He
is not obligated to leap into action but has broad discretion to dis-
miss complaints. Little formality is required other than a signed
letter stating the facts, and these requirements are not strictly en-
forced. An individual may walk into the ombudsman's office and
someone og the staff will assist him in drafting his complaint. No
attorney is required although they have been known to draft com-
plaints for their client's signature. 1 4 Anonymous complaints need
not be considered but ombudsmen have investigated some anyway.
Only New Zealand requires a filing fee, equivalent to $2.80,
to discourage frivolous complaints. Experience shows, however, that
the theory fails in practice. New Zealand has had its share of trivial
letters, but only a few are complaints from prison inmates who usu-
ally comprise a large share of the clientele elsewhere. This is some
indication that the fee has not discouraged the maladjusted but in-
stead has disadvantaged the impecunious."'
The Swedish processing procedure emphasizes the personal con-
trol of the Ombudsman. He frequently reads the complaint as it
arrives, sometimes scribbling instructions in the margin for a staff
assistant, or choosing to handle the case himself. The complaint is
then noted in a log. Most cases are assigned to a staff member who
109 Bexelius, supra note 13, at 29; address by Blix, supra note 4, at 93.
110 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 218-27; Bexelius, supra note 100, at 29;
address by Blix, supra note 4, at 93.
111 Note, in THE OMBUDSMAN at 184 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
112 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 218; see Bexelius, supra note 100, at 42-44.
113 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 426-31.




takes the next step whether it be drafting a letter stating the reasons
for its dismissal or requesting more information from the com-
plainant. If an investigation is undertaken, the assistant contacts the
agency and asks for the official file. The law requires public servants
to provide documents and to give information, and they cooperate.
The great majority of the cases are disposed of quickly after the file
is received. A letter to the complainant explaining the finding is
drafted for the Ombudsman, and the case is closed. No opinion is
published unless the case is one of those the Ombudsman considers
important enough to publish in his annual report to Parliament.
This publication procedure has produced a body of administrative
agency precedents which the Swedish agencies and Ombudsmen have
followed." 6
Other countries use a less cumbersome procedure. A complaint
which is not dismissed at once is sent to the agency for its explana-
tion. The ombudsman then forwards the comment to the individual.
Most are satisfied at that point; if not, the ombudsman will investi-




A viable inspection system does not exist even in Sweden where
tradition and publicity cause citizens to feel and to act as if one
were imminent. The Swedish Ombudsman, however, inspects as
much as he can, making deft utilization of the spot check by examin-
ing files at random in the agency under scrutiny."'
Field inspection seems to be an essential element of any effi-
cient and effective governmental organization. While the ombuds-
man can undoubtedly perform a valuable service here, especially by
unifying procedure, the task is beyond his capability as the institu-
tion is usually constituted. The public may have to rely on internal
audits by superiors in the structure to safeguard its interest. In
addition any individual subjected to administrative abuse always has
the option of filing a complaint with the ombudsman.
The plain facts are that no individual or small staff can ade-
quately inspect all the agencies in a modern government. Further,
the inspection may emphasize paperwork at the expense of training
of agency personnel, internal audits or reorganization planning."19
The extra documentation is just as apt to be that which exonerates
the official as that which adds comprehensiveness to the file or
assurance that safeguards were met. The Swedish Ombudsman has
116 See generally id. at 210-12. The annual report is discussed id. at 251-54. See also
Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 20, 1966 Hearings 109.
117 GELLI-iORN, supra note 9, at 213.
118 Id. at 218.
lip Id. at 223.
VOL. 45
COLORADO'S OMBUDSMAN OFFICE
recognized the futility of his attempt to reach each unit even as
seldom as once a decade, and he has pleaded for permission to dele-
gate routine complaints to the agency so as to free himself for ex-
ceptional complaints and more investigations.'2"
3. News Coverage
The news media play a large role in policing administrative
agencies. They usually do not tackle a technical problem but are
superb at exacting every drop of emotion out of a human interest
story. While the ombudsman avoids being drawn into the person-
alities of the situation, his trained eye may spot a procedural defi-
ciency or an inadequate law when others do not. He is free to delve
into the question on his own initiative.
F. Privileges and Immunities
The ombudsman's proceedings and decisions have been made
immune from judicial review except for the subpoena power which
he must enforce through the courts. A declaratory judgment, how-
ever, may be obtained in some countries when a party alleges the
ombudsman has contravened the provisions of the act creating the
office. Except in Sweden the ombudsman has control over whether
the press shall have access to his work. The ombudsman has been
accorded the same immunity from civil and criminal actions as
judges, and he and his staff are privileged not to testify about their
work.
121
G. Investigative and Procedural Powers
The ombudsman could be hamstrung without sufficient means
to carry out his task. The institution has been given the subpoena
power to compel any official to produce documents or to give testi-
mony relating to an investigation.' The ombudsman usually has
authority to establish his own rules of procedure for handling com-
plaints, except for the jurisdictional restrictions already discussed.
He has authority to initiate investigations, usually without notice.
128
He may recommend a change in statute to Parliament or to the
120 Bexelius, supra note 100, at 43.
121 See generally Bexelius, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 22,
24-25 (D. Rowat ed. 1965) (Sweden) ; Kastari, The Chancellor of Justice and the
Ombudsman, id. 58, at 62-63 (Finland); Northey, New Zealand's Parliamentary
Commissioner, id. 127, at 135-37 (New Zealand); Os, The Ombudsman for Civil
Affairs, id. 95, at 105 (Norway); Pedersen, Denmark's Ombudsman, id. 75,
at 81 (Denmark). See also Aaron, Utah Ombudsman: The American Proposals, 1967
UTAH L. REV. 57-58, for a collection of the privileges and immunities afforded by
the bills proposed in the United States.
122 See GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 431; e.g., Ombudsman Act § 16 (1962) (New Zea-
land), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132-49.
123 See GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 430.
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executive branch, or he may petition the agency for a change in its
procedures.1
2 4
Countries which have adopted the institution have not given
their ombudsmen sanctions as severe as those authorized in Sweden.
Only the Swedish and Finnish Ombudsmen have authority to re-
quire any civil servant to aid in investigating any matter, or to prose-
cute a public servant for the crime of dereliction of official duty.
Probably the most persuasive power an ombudsman has at his
command is publicity. Each existing ombudsman is required to file
an annual report with the parliament. The Swedish Ombudsman's
report, running up to 500 pages, outlines the work he has done and
contains a fully reasoned opinion for each important case. While
most officials never see it because it is printed in only 3,400 copies,
they appear to be aware of its contents through secondary sources,
i.e., the press and specialized publications. There is a determined
effort by officials to avoid the stigma of being named critically in
the report.'1
2
Even more influential than the annual report is the daily press
coverage given an ombudsman's opinions. It is through this medium
that his criticisms and suggestions gain wide circulation. The Swed-
ish public believes it has excellent civil servants so it expects high
quality performance from them. When a serious shortcoming is
brought to light, the public treats it as a scandal. Civil servants on
the sharp end of the news story react quickly to avoid a recurrence.
Usually the news media does not identify the official's name or title,
but his haste to make corrections is no less because his identity will
be revealed in the annual report.
1 26
Experience has shown that an ombudsman seldom has any need
to invoke his procedural powers. The power of publicity and the
existence of the formal powers are subtle threats which have been
persuasive enough to assure the ombudsman cooperation and to gain
the information his work requires.'1
7
The ombudsman's primary powers, the right to investigate and
to recommend, are not insignificant assets because of the very na-
ture of the institution. Since he has no formalized authority to im-
pose his opinion on the agency, he must resort to the persuasive tools
of logic and reason augmented by the weight of his personal in-
fluence. If the agency rejects his suggestion without a good reason,
124 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 205-08; Anderman, The Swedish Justitie-
ombudsman, 11 AM. J. CoMp. L. 225-31 (1962), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 96-100;
Bexelius, supra note 121, at 78-79.
12 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 251-54; Bainbridge, A Civilized Thing, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 13, 1965, reprinted in 1966 Hearings 107-08.
126 See generally Lundvik, Comments on the Ombudsmen for Civil Affairs, in THE
OMBUDSMAN 44, 49-50 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
12 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 436-37.
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he can resort to publicity to roast the agency in the wrath of public
opinion. Publicity may not be the power to command, but it comes
close to compulsion. Again, this power has not been used fre-
quently, nor have personal attacks been indulged.
H. Common Results
The ombudsman development outside Sweden and Finland is
relatively young, too new to evaluate with certainty that it will re-
main as effective as it now appears. Even so, its success in these
adoptive countries is generally recognized after the five to fifteen
years of trial it has undergone. The remarkable similarity of results
reached from Scandinavia to New Zealand to Nassau County, New
York, affords some assurance that the established pattern is stable.
Crank letters have comprised only a small percentage of the com-
plaints. Most cases have been dismissed immediately or after a brief
investigation, and only ten to fifteen percent of the complaints have
been judged meritorious.12 The variations in results appear to be
due more to differences in classifying cases because of differing
jurisdictional limits and standards of judgment than to variations
in personality characteristics among the nationalities. 9
The small number of complaints found to be deserving is not
an indication the value of the office has been negligible; its mere
existence has considerable effect. Knowledge that its aid may be
invoked serves as an incentive to agency officials to give good
service."' Public confidence in public administration is increased
by the mere fact that anyone has the possibility of presenting his
case to the ombudsman.
If the public is to have faith in the integrity of its government,
accusations of scandal or other abuse should not go unanswered.
The governing officials can hardly assuage the public's suspicion
because they obviously have an interest in whitewashing a deficiency.
The ombudsman, however, can heal the sore before it becomes an
open wound.' It is his responsibility to investigate these matters
in depth and to publicize his findings. If he is objective enough
to do that unhesitantly, he will do much to restore faith in govern-
ment. Sometimes he will be responsible for a great shakeup,13 2 but
128 At the end of the first year of his work, Judge Samuel Greason, Public Protector of
Nassau County, felt that 20% of his cases were well founded. County Executive of
Nassau County, N.Y., Press Release, July 12, 1967.
129 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 118-19.
130 Bexelius, supra note 121, at 41.
131 Id. at 42.
132 See, e.g., GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 57. The Finnish Ombudsman demanded the
indictment of two cabinet members and two former Ministers for improper use of




more frequently he will exonerate faithful government servants.
The ombudsman office is a safety valve to those who invoke its aid
as well as to the great majority who know they could call on it for
help if their particular impasse with government grows worse. It
vindicates directly the rights of only a small number whose complaint
succeeds, but at the same time it serves others indirectly.
The great strength of the concept has been the flexibility with
which it has adapted to the differing demands made in each new
home. Most observers credit the individuals who have served as
ombudsmen with its successes. The ombudsmen's skills have molded
the office to their countries while their stature has bolstered its
effectiveness.
This emphasis on personalism casts some doubt about the fu-
ture capability of a single ombudsman assisted by a small staff.
Many governmental units have populations which already could
produce more complaints than one key individual can effectively
process. Some proponents of an official critic have suggested in-
stalling more than one ombudsman so there would be enough to
handle the volume of complaints. 33 But there is some question
whether a committee can establish and maintain the rapport and
identity with the people which has seemed necessary to public con-
fidence. Some observers feel those characteristics would not be lost,
but there is little proof.1 3 ' The best approach for Colorado is to
avoid experimenting with a plural ombudsman since the relatively
small population makes it appear unnecessary here.
III. Is THERE A NEED IN COLORADO?
A. Government by Administrative Agencies
Governmental responsibility to regulate is increasingly falling
to the administrative agencies. Major issues in the lives of un-
counted citizens are routinely settled by the administrative process.
Observers have estimated that three to four times as many decisions
are handed down by the agencies as by the courts. 13 15 With all this
governmental activity closely touching so many people, it was in-
evitable that irritations, suspicion and hostility would develop.
This is not to say that those who enter the public payroll auto-
matically become "power-crazed, obtuse, venal, ill-mannered, and
133 E.g., Reuss and Munsey, The United States, in THE OMBUDSMAN 194-200 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965); testimony of Dr. William Winter before the Colorado House
State Affairs Committee, Feb. 28, 1967. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1967, at 32, col. 1.
134 Professor Gellhorn discounts the necessity of the personalism which has usually been
an obivous factor in ombudsman institutions. He cites the fact that Sweden actually
has three ombudsmen, the Chancellor of Justice, the Military Ombudsman, and the
Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, without any loss of public identity caused by this
multiplicity. GELIHORN, supra note 9, at 255.
135 THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 2 (S. Krislov & L. Musolf ed. 1964).
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inefficient. ' 136  Criticism of the agency process is not necessarily
criticism of the individuals who comprise it. Human error will al-
ways be present, and American public servants are no different than
other citizens. It is doubtful that their governmental career works
any metamorphosis of their character, as many believe. Approxi-
mately one out of six employed Americans is paid from the public
treasury at some level of government. 3 It is contrary to logic and
daily experience to assert that so large a number is unfit to serve
the public faithfully and well.
If all agency personnel are not guilty of deliberate wrongdoing
or careless mistake, all are not innocent either. A Senate judiciary
subcommittee recently concluded that " 'undue influence,' 'illegal
ex parte communications between private individuals and govern-
ment agencies' and a record of 'inaction, endless delays, favoritism
and arbitrary actions' . . . have created a 'wide-spread lack of public
confidence in the fairness of agency decisions.' ""
The great increase in the number and size of regulatory agencies
widens the opportunity for improper use of governmental power.
Modern administration is both complex and powerful. The immen-
sity of its responsibilities accounts for a serious conflict in its own
goals: the merits and circumstances of each case should be weighed
carefully, but the public obligation to fulfill all its tasks forces the
agency to largely ignore individual differences. It can only operate
efficiently by standardizing its procedures to fit the average case
which cannot exist. Furthermore, the agency becomes so entangled
in its own efforts that it is in no position to objectively evaluate the
quality of the service it provides.
It is common parlance to label this burgeoning governmental
phenomenon, "bureaucracy," and to saddle it with all the unsavory
connotations that the term implies. The citizen increasingly views
himself as living at the mercy of an ever growing and inaccessible
administrative structure. A reasonably high level of public confi-
dence in government is vital to a democracy. While America has
not reached a danger point, it is no exaggeration to say that dis-
satisfaction continually mounts as the opportunity for friction in-
creases. The belief that governmental decisions are made frequently
by resort to influence peddling or outright graft is common. "'39 If
nothing worse, everyone is sure the public's best interest takes secon-
dary consideration to the official's best interest. This type of sus-
picion has branded every politician's pronouncements suspect; it has
136 W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 1 (1966).
137 Id. at 43.
1
38 Westin, Inquiry Into Our Watchdog Agencies, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 13
(S. Krislov & L. Musolf ed. 1964) (referring to federal agencies).
13
9 See W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 139'(1966).
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kept many of the best qualified from entering public service; it has
encouraged cynicism and apathy. 4 ' The problem is one which no
modern government can ignore.
American governments have more elaborate safeguards against
governmental abuse than any other country in the world.' 4 ' The
safeguards are, ironically, so systematized, inflexible and misunder-
stood that they are themselves cited as evidence of red tape.
142
Furthermore, there is no right to review of administrative determina-
tions beyond the strictly legal issues. 143 The individual is not inter-
ested in the legal technicalities; the sum total of his grievance may
be that he does not understand why the decision was adverse to his
interests. He may suspect the important facts were ignored, that
procedure was prejudicial, or that somehow he was the victim of foul
play. He wants a full review, far more than the terse technical re-
sponse the appellate process can provide.' 4 4 The highly vaunted right
of appeal is too frequently illusory, if only because economics exerts
a tremendous pressure to accept the administrative determination.
A good indication of the inadequacy of the present system is
the current level of discontent reflected in the heavy volume of
congressional complaints at the national level. No one knows just
how large it is, but each House and Senate member receives several
hundred to several thousand constituent letters each week. Most of
these are requests for favors or aid and comfort of some sort rather
than a complaint about administrative abuse. Still, the latter com-
prise substantial numbers.
45
While the criticisms against the national administrative process
are best documented, the same indictment is applicable to state and
local levels of government.' 46 Probably the need is greater at the
state level because the quality of government performance is all too
frequently lower.' 47
B. Colorado Administrative Government
There are good reasons to doubt that the ombudsman institu-
tion can be transplanted with success into the American federal
140 Id.
141 Id. at 212; see Abraham, The Need jor an Ombudsman in the United States, in THE
OMBUDSMAN 234, 235 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
142 W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 1 (1966).




5 See generally W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 58-66 (1966).
146 Abraham, supra note 141, at 236; see Krislov, A Restrained View, in THE OMBUDS-
MAN 246, 254 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
147 Authorities cited note 146 supra.
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government.'4 8 The staggering size and diversity of the population
are foremost. The sheer volume of complaints would make anything
like personal review totally impossible. The ombudsman, faced with
a heterogeneous citizenry and keen competition for publicity, could
not develop the nationwide rapport which is essential. The complex
and delicate system of checks and balances which are unique to
America also militate against the proposal. The executive branch
would look askance at a legislative agent probing into its adminis-
trative processes. The doctrine of separation of powers which gives
rise to the executive privilege to conceal information would inter-
fere with the ombudsman's investigation. The necessity of running
for re-election is a strong incentive for national legislators to deal
directly with their constituents. Therefore, congressmen have not
welcomed a national ombudsman who could receive complaints
and who would thus stand between them and their best chance of
re-election.' 49
The same objections are not so strong when a Colorado om-
budsman is considered. 5 ° The problems of unwieldy geographic
size, population and diversity do not exist in Colorado. The institu-
tion has been found workable in Sweden with eight million people,
and Colorado's present population is estimated at two million.'
5 '
An ombudsman in the traditional, personalistic sense would be
'
48 See generally Abraham, supra note 141, at 237-38; Krislov, supra note 146, at
245-54; Marx, supra note 143, at 258-63.
149 Representative Henry S. Reuss believes that the congressman's role as a mediator
between citizens and bureaucracy is an unshakeable part of American government
because the legislators feel the breadth and quality of their direct contact with their
constituents is the difference between re-election and defeat. Therefore, he proposes
creation of an Administrative Counsel of the Congress. Congressmen could refer
their constituents' complaints to the Administrative Counsel whose expert staff
would investigate and report to the Congressman. The legislator could use the
information to urge the agency to change an error, and he could reply to the con-
stituent so he would not lose credit for the good deed. Reuss & Munsey, The United
States, in THE OMBUDSMAN 194-98 (D. Rowat ed. 1965). Representative Reuss'
bill was introduced in the House in 1963, but so far he has been unsuccessful in
gaining support for his plan. Abraham, supra note 141, at 237.
The supposition that congressmen depend on constituent service for re-election,
as well as several other points applicable to this article, is made vividly apparent in
a recent letter to The Denver Post:
There is no mystery about why Byron Rogers is returned to office
every two years, and will continue to be just as long as he chooses to serve.
He takes care of his constituents!
A phone call to his Denver office last week got right through to
Congressman Rogers himself. He listened attentively to my tale of woe
about government red tape gone wild, took notes, promised to look into
the matter and called back the very next day to report.
It happens he was unable to remedy the situation, but how comforting
to know that somebody cares.
Big government does not have to be impersonal.
Denver Post, July 24, 1967, at 19, col. 2.
150 Abraham, supra note 141, at 238.
151 The Census Bureau estimated the population at 1,975,000 as of July 1, 1967. Rocky
Mountain News, Sept. 6, 1967, at 1, col. 4. It was placed at slightly over two million
as of December 31, 1966, by a business group based on the volume of retail sales.
SALES MANAGEMENT, June 10, 1967, Table B-1.
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possible because the -volume of complaints would be manageable
by one official critic aided by a small staff. The ombudsman should
be able to command the attention of his public. He would not be
faced with the tremendous competition for publicity that would
block this development on a national level. Accounts of his work
would be assured of a statewide audience through the local news-
papers and the local radio and television stations which extend their
influence throughout the state.
The problems created by the separation of powers are not so
easily dismissed. The Governor may have overshadowed the legis-
lature in actual powers1"2 as the President has surpassed Congress.
But the personal influence of the Governor is less pervasive and less
jealously guarded than that of the President, and it is likely that
competition for prestige would be proportionally less at the state
level. The legislature's agent could thus expect to be met with less
hostility by the executive branch, so the Governor's people might
less adamantly assert executive privilege to deny access to informa-
tion. The legislature could no doubt resolve this problem by bestow-
ing upon the ombudsman the authority to subpoena documents and
to compel testimony as has been done in the countries with the insti-
tution.' 53 The constitutionality of such powers has been upheld
against a due process challenge on the ground that purely investiga-
tive proceedings do not require all the safeguards of rule making
or adjudicatory functions.'54 As long as the ombudsman can only
investigate without having authority to issue orders, the separation
of powers doctrine will not be violated.' 55
Granting that an ombudsman could be constitutionally fitted
into the governmental structure of the state, what does the future
152 Nader, Ombudsmen for State Governments, in THE OMBUDSMAN 240, 241 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965).
153 Text accompanying note 122 supra.
154 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
155 Cf. 1 E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 21-25 (1965); Stockman v. Leddy,
55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912) (legislature may not assume an executive function
reserved to governor by the state Constitution). Colorado has long adhered to a
strict separation of powers doctrine. COLO. LEG. RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT TO
THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SIMPLIFICATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION pt. IV, at 6 (1964). The agencies have been known to assert a right
to refuse the general assembly certain information. In 1950 the Regents of the
University of Colorado investigated their faculty for subversives after one professor
testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee that he had been a
member of the Communist Party from 1938 to 1943. The Regents undertook self-
investigation to quiet the great public furor which arose and also to head off a legis-
lative investigation. The report was kept confidential by the Regents. In 1951 mem-
bers of the assembly demanded it be made public. This was not done, so the assembly
then demanded that it be turned over to the legislature in executive session. The
Regents again refused the demand for disclosure, but finally caucused with the
governor and legislative leaders to give them a summary. Other than this, the report
was never disclosed, although there was no court determination of the agency's right
to refuse. R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME, Appendix B: The Univer-
sity of Colorado Investigates 290-304 (1955).
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in Colorado hold for an ombudsman? Several questions for which
there are no ready answers should be examined before any bold
prediction is made.
C. The Need in Colorado
The crucial issue is whether an ombudsman is needed. There
can be no clear cut statistical answer because there are no figures
by which to calculate the level of citizen dissatisfaction with admin-
istrative agencies. Random sampling could easily provide an answer,
but even if statistics were available there is no assurance they would
be useful. We need to know something about the intensity of dis-
satisfaction. Everyone could say they disliked their prior experience
with administration, but more pertinent is whether that affects their
faith in government.
We need to know whether the present complaints are meri-
torious, but even this information would provide no definite answer
to whether a Colorado ombudsman is needed. Even if complaints
are unfounded, they should be met head on as long as they are made
in good faith so that trust in government can be maintained. If they
are not justified the individual should be given an explanation, and
if they are justified a remedy should be sought.
Approaching the question of need from a different perspective
may be helpful. Colorado is not among the most populous of the fifty
states. Even so, a vast administrative network has been developed to
carry out state functions. There are departments, boards, divisions,
commissions and other units in great number - 212 by one count,
and more if some closely related units are counted separately.' 56
This bewildering array has properly been called "the headless
fourth branch of government."' 57 The state constitution neatly cate-
gorized government into the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches,"" but in recent years administrative agencies which are
neither one nor the other have been created without clear thought
where they fit. They have authority to promulgate rules which have
the effect of laws, they enforce the laws, and they adjudicate matters
of great importance. They thus have characteristics of each of the
three branches, but they are not effectively supervised by any of
them. The judiciary has no jurisdiction except over the few cases
which reach its appellate courts, so it cannot affect the administra-
156 State Management Analysis Office, Organization of State Government in Colorado
(Jan. 1967) (organizational chart based on the state statutes and budget groupings).
'
5
7TIME, July 31, 1964, at 57 (Senator Everett Dirksen referring to the federal rcg-
ulatory agencies).
158 CoLo. CONST. art. III.
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tive agencies except in a tangential, sporadic fashion. The general
assembly meets for only four months in the long session and for
only three months in the biennial short session.159 It maintains no
permanent legislative oversight committee to keep an eye on the
agencies.' 60 The only supervision forthcoming from this branch is
the highly superficial review the general assembly can give an agency
when it passes on the annual budget.
The executive branch should be in the best position to check
administrative abuse. The Governor's singularity has placed him in
a bright spotlight of publicity which focuses on him the year around
rather than briefly during sessions of the assembly. He can call for
expert advice upon his legislation proposals, exercise party discipline
in the assembly, and prevail upon pressure groups to aid his legis-
lative program.' But the Governor of Colorado is practically
powerless to control actual administration of state functions. Several
of the most powerful department heads are elected directly.' " 2 The
Governor is placed in a much weaker position in relation to the
administrative agencies than in many other states by virtue of an
extremely strong state civil service program. He may appoint to
fill a vacancy, but he cannot remove a civil service official. They
serve almost indefinitely and can be removed only in accordance
with the civil service rules' 63 which strongly protect the public
servant.
The Governor's 1966 attempt to discipline the commissioner of
insurance is a case in point. The Governor took the commissioner
to task before the public for what he considered unlawful acceptance
of "any valuable thing" from the regulated insurance interests, and
he recommended removal from office. The Civil Service Commis-
sion, possibly feeling the heat of public opinion, fired the com-
missioner, but a Colorado district court ordered him reinstated
because the strict technicalities of the civil service laws had not
159 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 7. The general assembly is limited during the short session
to acting on the state budget and those subjects placed on the governor's call. Id.
160 The Legislative Council on June 22, 1964, authorized the Clerk of the House of
Representatives to review the rules and regulations adopted by Colorado administra-
tive agencies. Mr. Donald H. Henderson's report contained graphic evidence of the
need for some sort of permanent review of agency rule making. Rules of nine of
the twenty-three licensing agencies were studied, and all or part of the rules of seven
were found invalid. The shortcoming was failure to comply with the requirement of
notice established by the Administrative Procedure Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-16-1 to -6 (1963). COLO. LEG. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 155.
161 Cf. Nader, supra note 152.
162 Secretary of state, attorney general, state treasurer. CoLo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3;
Regents of the University of Colorado. Id. art. IX, § 12.
163 State Civil Service Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-5-1 to -32 (1963). See par-
ticularly § 26-5-23 for dismissal procedure. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13 provides
that appointments to positions classified as civil service employment must be based
on competitive tests of competence.
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been met. 164 The commissioner remained in office, but the Gov-
ernor's actions probably were an effective reminder to him and
others in similar positions. The problem with leaving this sort of
supervision to the Governor is one of logistics. He simply does
not have the time nor the facilities to take on this additional task
and to devote the necessary time to it.
16 5
In the present situation the Colorado agencies are relatively
free to interpret and apply the law as they see fit without effective
control from any source. The delegations of power to them are
necessarily broad and vague. They must use their judgment to
determine what the law is. The problem is that their biases, although
inherent in any exercise of judgment, may not be what the assembly
contemplated or what the standards expressed by the legislature
would mean to a court. " The individuals whose interests are
adversely affected may protest, but that probably will not be per-
suasive. The agency interpretation gains significance as a precedent,
and furthermore it is characteristic of human nature to resist
change.' 67
An example of a common administrative abuse is that the
licensing agencies all too frequently have been used by the regulated
industry or profession to close the door to competition rather than
164 Denver Post, Mar. 11, 1967, at 1, col. 1. The district court ruled that there had been
no compliance with the statute requiring filing of written charges that the employee
failed to comply with commission standards.
Another example of the Governor's lack of effective control over civil service
officials was cited by the Colorado Legislature's Committee on Government Re-
organization as the committee was attempting on November 11, 1967, to define the
Governor's role vis-a-vis the heads of state departments:
[The] dispute [was] between former Gov. Steve McNichols and William
M. Williams, head of the old Planning Division. When Williams refused
to follow McNichols' orders, the governor had to bypass Williams to get
certain jobs done. But Williams kept his job because he was protected by
the Civil Service system.
The committee proposed the following statute for enactment by the legislature
as part of the reorganization plan:
The governor, in accordance with Article IV, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution, shall be the chief executive officer of the state. Subject to the
Constitution and the laws of this state, the governor shall be responsible
for formulating and administering the policies of the executive branch of
the state government.
In the execution of these policies, the governor shall have full powers
of supervision, approval, direction and appointment over all principal
departments....
Where a conflict arises between the head of a principal department
and the governor or between the heads of principal departments as to the
administration of such policies, such conflicts shall be resolved by the
governor and the decision of the governor shall be final.
Denver Post, Nov. 12, 1967, at 28, col. 1.
165 It should be noted that an ombudsman could have done no more in this situation
than the Governor. But the Governor's attempt to remove the insurance commissioner
was certainly fruitful in the long run, and the ombudsman cannot be criticized
because he could have done the same thing.
166 Contra, Byse, A Modest Proposal, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 58-59 (S. Kris-
lov & L. Musolf ed. 1964).
167 See, e.g., statement of Senator Edward V. Long, 1966 Hearings 2.
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to protect the public interest by admitting qualified applicants.168
Another common fault is that the agencies have not usually exercised
their powers to promulgate rules, preferring instead to decide each
case on the basis of standards which remain unrevealed to the public.
Colorado's Administrative Procedure Act offers little help in correct-
ing this shortcoming because it does not require promulgation of
rules.
169
Agency abuses in administering the law continue unchecked
largely because there is no one unit charged with supervision of the
agencies. This fact makes them virtually independent; this is the
strongest single argument for adopting an ombudsman. Many of
the most constructive changes for which he could work are the
sort of thing which no individual citizen would have standing to
contest. The serious problem of agency operation by secret law could
be attacked by an individual affected by it in a particular case, but
only an official critic could systematically review its use in each
administrative unit and issue a single opinion applicable to all
agencies.
Ralph Nader has compiled an impressive list of some of the
administrative abuses which a state ombudsman could attack:
preferential treatment and influence peddling, inadequate and un-
published regulations, wrongful detention, state police overzealous-
ness or laxity, unjust procedures in agency hearings, arbitrary censor-
ship or secrecy, agency reluctance or refusal to give explicit reasons
for decisions, patronage excesses, inefficiencies and delays by state
personnel, undesirable conditions in prisons and mental institutions,
payoffs and kickbacks in state contracts, and discriminatory enforce-
ment or flagrant non-enforcement of state laws.' 70
IV. THE PRESENT COLORADO SITUATION
A. Colorado's Proposed Legislation for an Ombudsman
An ombudsman bill was introduced in each house of the general
assembly in 1967.171 While neither bill was enacted, 72 they are
important indicators of the type of institution their proponents
would transplant to Colorado. It is probable that another ombudsman
bill will be introduced at some future date in this state, and that it
168 Hamilton, How to Turn Regulation into License, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
63 (S. Krislov & L. Musolf ed. 1964) (federal agencies); Nader, supra note 152,
at 242.
169 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-2 (1963).
170 Nader, supra note 152, at 246.
171 S.B. 192, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1967), was introduced in the senate
by Demorcatic Senator Anthony Vollack and Democratic Representative Tom Bastien
on Feb. 10, 1967. H.B. 1223, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1967), was intro-
duced in the house by Republican Representative Tom Grimshaw on the same day.
172 The house bill was reported favorably by the Committee on State Affairs, but it was
killed in the powerful Rules Committee. The senate bill died in the Judiciary Com-
mittee without having had a hearing.
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will embody the same basic features as the original models. This
is the pattern that ombudsman proposals have taken in the nine
other states which have considered such legislation. 73 Therefore,
it will be useful to consider these bills.
Both bills would create a strong ombudsman in the traditional
sense. They are alike in many features, but there are some important
differences. 174 Both bills would make the ombudsman an agent of
the legislature. The senate bill would establish an eight member
ombudsman committee to nominate candidates for the office, to
supervise the ombudsman's work, and to receive the annual report.
The house bill would create a committee, but only to nominate
candidates, not to supervise and not to receive an annual report.
In fact, it does not require a report. The ombudsman would simply
be authorized to report to the general assembly or governor as he
deems advisable.
The house bill would give the ombudsman broad authority to
investigate any administrative action. There is no limit on the au-
thority to examine discretionary acts, and no requirement that
administrative remedies be exhausted. The senate bill attempts to
articulate some limits on jurisdiction. It allows the ombudsman to
recommend corrective action to the agency if he finds any decision
was "unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or discriminatory, or was
based upon a mistake of law or fact," or that a discretionary power
was exercised arbitrarily or for an improper purpose. The om-
budsman has wide discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint
if there is an adequate remedy elsewhere or if the matter is more
than one year old.
These broad grants of jurisdiction, without a requirement that
other remedies be exhausted or that stale complaints be rejected,
would no doubt lead to an ever expanding assumption of jurisdiction
as it has in other countries. The senate provision allowing the
ombudsman discretion on these two points is desirable, but there
must be some check or that limitation could become no more than
a mild exhortation. Certainly the language granting such broad
jurisdiction could be seized upon to legitimate recommendations on
any agency action. Experience abroad shows that it could and would
happen. Committee review would be necessary to keep this power
in proper bounds.
The ombudsman would have full investigative powers by either
proposal, including subpoena power for testimony and documents
whether the person is a state employee or not and whether the docu-
173 Aaron, Utah Ombudsman: The American Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 32, 34 n.13.
174 The house bill was patterned after an Illinois bill, and the senate bill was based on
a proposal introduced in California.
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ment is within the control of a state agency or not. Persons who
mislead or obstruct the ombudsman could be found guilty of a
misdemeanor and fined up to $1,000.
One disturbing aspect of both bills is that they would prevent
the ombudsman from disclosing any information obtained "except
for the purpose of giving effect to this act." '175 He could thus make
facts public when such action might be conducive to bringing about
a procedural change. There is grave doubt, however, that this
language would allow him to engage in the educational campaign
which other ombudsmen have undertaken. The public must have
a keen awareness of the type of work being done, and possibly
such public education qualifies as furthering the purposes of the
act. But surely the scholarly articles which other governments find
so helpful would be precluded. There is no need for this severe
restriction; those reports should be allowed as long as they do not
divulge names or other personal information.
The House Committee on State Affairs favorably recommended
its bill, and the amendments it made offer striking information about
the aspects with which the legislators were most concerned. The
amendments are encouraging. Instead of election by two-thirds of
each house, the ombudsman would be elected by a majority of each
party in each house, i.e., four separate votes would be necessary. This
is a strong and definite move to place the ombudsman above partisan
considerations. On the other hand, it may be difficult to find someone
whom all four groups would support. By another change, the
ombudsman would be restricted to two full terms of six years
each rather than being eligible for three full terms. The amendment
means the committee appreciated the possibility of stagnation in
office.
The committee struck the requirement that the ombudsman
be a lawyer and retained the prerequisite of being learned in the
processes of law and government.' 76 An ombudsman without legal
training would be forced to turn frequently for advice to an attorney,
creating a real danger that his judgments would not be his own.
It would inevitably slow his work by requiring him to take more
time to learn the applicable law or to confer with his adviser.
The provision defeats three of the most important aspects of the
institution: speed, personalism, and expertise. Quick action is neces-
sary or else another bureaucracy with complex procedural rules
175 H.B. 1223, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (4) (1967). A similar restriction
is expressed in S.B. 192, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 11 (8) (1967).
176Testimony of Professor Donald Seney of the Political Science Department of the
University of Denver before the State Affairs Committee on Feb. 28, 1967. See also
text accompanying notes 44-52 for a discussion of legal training as a prerequisite.




for giving service will be created. Personalism is important to public
confidence. The ombudsman must believe in his opinions and be
able to argue them persuasively in his daily contacts without reading
from a staff memorandum. Personal expertise is essential to con-
vincing a reluctant agency there is another way. The whole tenor
of the office calls less for institutional expertise than for personal
ability. In short, the ombudsman must above all be his own man.
The amendment would severely restrict his ability to so establish
himself.
The committee added a provision requiring that someone on
the staff have administrative agency experience. Sweden has recently
found it necessary to appoint specialists from the various adminis-
trative fields to the staff,177 and it seems as important in Colorado
as there. This assistant may be appointed from the state govern-
ment without loss of tenure or retirement benefits, an idea which
could well be extended to the ombudsman too. The house bill would
have allocated $60,000 for the first year's budget. The ombudsman's
salary would be set on a par with that of a judge of the Colorado
Supreme Court. The ombudsman could select his own staff and set
their salaries as he might choose out of the budget. On the other
hand, the senate bill made no appropriation and empowered the
committee to establish salaries, powers which could well destroy the
independence of the office.
Both bills would explicitly make the ombudsman an agency
in the legislative branch. This in itself frees him of the require-
ments of the state Administrative Procedure Act which requires due
process in rule making and adjudication by agencies in the executive
branch.1' A requirement to proceed by elaborate APA rules would
stifle his efforts and go far to make the institution just another
bureaucracy.
Each bill alone is woefully inadequate, but taken together their
parts arrive at a facsimile of the traditional ombudsman. They would
create a surprisingly strong ombudsman, place him above politics,
and leave him with virtually no supervision. The weakness of the
proposals lies primarily in their lack of limits on jurisdiction over
stale complaints, over discretionary actions, and over complaints for
which other remedies exist. The drafters drew on some of the strong
points of bills proposed in other states, e.g., giving the ombudsman
power to apply to a court for a declaratory judgment to determine
his authority to conduct an investigation or to issue a report when
either is disputed. And the bills go to great length to assure the
177Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 Am. J. CoMP. L. 225, 237 (1962),
reprinted in 1966 Hearings 96, 105.
1 78 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-16-1 to-6 (1963).
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investigated agency a chance to correct a deficiency before it is criti-
cized publicly.
The bills present a potpourri of ideas rather than a comprehen-
sive plan. The legislature would be well advised to substitute most
of the model bill prepared by the Harvard Student Legislative Re-
search BureauT 9 if and when another proposal is considered. The
model bill is impressive for the comprehensive scheme it presents,
and for its limitation on jurisdiction. However, the Harvard idea
for gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of the
senate should be rejected in favor of the State Affairs Committee
amendment. The latter assures bipartisan selection by the general
assembly, consistent with the theory that the ombudsman is the
agent of the legislature.
B. The Lieutenant Governor as Ombudsman
Colorado has an unprecedented opportunity to shed valuable
light on the entire question of transplanting an ombudsman to
America since Lieutenant Governor Mark Hogan voluntarily as-
sumed that role for the state. Mr. Hogan announced that he pro-
posed to act as intermediary for people who have problems "in their
relations with that massive, bureaucratic maze called government....
The people of Colorado need this service. For the average citizen
who has business to transact in government, the complex agencies
sometimes are not only baffling but also forbidding."' 80 The public
has responded. After the first ten months, Mr. Hogan reports receiv-
ing approximately 1,325 cases.' 8 '
The voluntary assumption of the official critic's role by the
Lieutenant Governor means several things. He can compile solid,
statistical evidence of Colorado's need for an ombudsman. For the
first time the number of complaints as well as their merits can be
made amenable to logical discussion rather than based on emo-
tional and intuitive assumptions. The capacity of an official critic
to get results and to stimulate change in statutes or procedure can
be tested. The ability of the people to understand the institution,
and the willingness of the news media to support its efforts can be
analyzed. Perhaps even the traditional value of the institution as an
advocate of better government and a means of increasing the pub-
lic's confidence in its government can be evaluated.
Not only is this opportunity to evaluate based on solid data
important to Colorado, but it should reveal important facts for the
1792 H.ARV. J. LEGIS. 213, 221-26 (1965).
180 Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Jan. 15, 1967, at 6-D, col. 1.
181 Interview with Mark Hogan, Lieutenant Governor of Colorado, in Denver, Nov. 2,
1967. The following statements attributed to Mr. Hogan were made during this
interivew unless another source is indicated.
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rest of the United States. It is a unique undertaking. While Hawaii
has enacted an ombudsman bill it has not funded the operation and
there is no present intent to do so.18 2 Michigan has, so far as is
known, the only other functioning ombudsman office outside Colo-
rado. The secretary of state of Michigan appointed an administra-
tive assistant to receive citizen complaints in 1966,113 but this ap-
pointee can be no more than an aide to a state officer. Many state
elected officials have received complaints in the past, but those
efforts cannot be considered ombudsman institutions by any fair
definition.
Colorado's experience should be more valuable because the
present Lieutenant Governor has a remarkably independent position.
He is a Democrat holding high office under a Republican governor,
and working with an assembly controlled by Republicans. Whatever
else can be said about the political implications, it is clear that Mr.
Hogan is not functioning as an administrative assistant for an elected
official of the majority party. He holds a virtually autonomous posi-
tion with no need to act as the majority party's chief of whitewash.
A public protector was appointed along party lines last year
in Nassau County, New York. 84 His work in a metropolitan county
government will be instructive for the states, but Colorado's experi-
ence at the state level should surpass it in value.
The only other ombudsman office in operation handles com-
plaints against the federal government and is closer to congressional
constituent casework than the functions of an ombudsman. This last
individual was appointed by Congressman Henry S. Reuss to his
staff to collect data in what will be the congressman's renewed ef-
fort to establish a national ombudsman counsel. The work will be
confined to Congressman Reuss's Fifth Congressional District in
Wisconsin. The appointment was effective in February 1967, and
the purpose is to collect data for only a few months after which the
office apparently will be abandoned and the results published."'
Despite its great potential, much of what Colorado's experience
could show will not be realized, or at least not until the present
operation is conducted on a more systematic basis. Mr. Hogan has
stated that he and his staff are making no efforts to collect or to
record data. The reasons are understandable: he has not been allo-
cated state funds for a staff, which forces him to rely on volunteer
assistance; he has no intention to create another bureaucracy with
182 10 STATE GOVERNMENT NEws, July 1967, at 7. See also Rocky Mountain News,
June 15, 1967, at 55, col. 1.
183 Secretary of State of Michigan, Press Release, Aug. 31, 1966.
184 Authorities and material cited note 7 supra.
185 N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1967 § 1, at 67, col. 1.
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elaborate rules of operating procedure; and lastly he does not wish
to abuse the confidence of citizens by recording personal matters.
These factors seem insignificant, however, when they are meas-
ured against the potential importance of what Mr. Hogan has under-
taken. They are obstacles which could be overcome. For instance,
since much of the work is first received, then investigated, and per-
haps resolved over the telephone, it seems feasible that certain in-
formation concerning the complaint could be recorded in a daily log.
Not much recordation is necessary to provide good statistical in-
formation. A few simple notations of basic facts should provide
enough data on which to properly evaluate the institution. Foremost
is an accurate counting of the volume. The agency against which
the complaint is lodged is important, and the disposition of cases
is essential to a valid study. Statistics could then be readily compiled
at periodic intervals. The following information would be sufficient:
1. Volume of Cases
Complaints
Referrals from Legislators
Undertaken on Own Initiative
2. Agency Complained Against




Inadequacy in Present Law
Misconduct of Officials
4. Disposition of Cases
Requests for Information
Dismissed Without Investigation
Declined for Want of Jurisdiction




Dismissed - No Direct Action Possible
Criticisms or Recommendation Issued
Time is probably the critical factor in the Lieutenant Governor's
ability to collect this data. Mr. Hogan should not be saddled with
great burdens, but by assuming the duty on his own initiative he
takes on some responsibility to the public to provide the means by
which to rationally evaluate the institution. His primary concern,
he states, is to serve the public's need for an official critic. The
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public's need for reliable information about an official ombudsman
for Colorado is hardly less.
Recording these facts would not result in the creation of another
bureaucracy. Those complaints received or answered by letter are
already filed. Use of the telephone has proven beneficial so its use
should be continued in this particular office. But the receipt of a
case and its disposition should be logged in a docket whether it is
handled by letter, personal interview or telephone.
The Colorado proposals for an ombudsman would have re-
quired that complaints be made by a signed letter as is the rule
elsewhere. At the hearing before the house committee, Professor
Seney of the Political Science Department of the University of Denver,
criticized this requirement. He said, "A person ought to be able to
come into the ombudsman's office and, in a sense, pour his heart
out. In many cases individuals might hesitate to complain if a writ-
ten statement were required."' 6
Evidently in response, the committee amended the house bill
to allow receipt of a verbal complaint if it is put in writing, pre-
sumably by the staff, and signed by the complainant. This is the
procedure which has been workable in Sweden, but almost all com-
plaints have been received there in writing. Mr. Hogan's experience
already shows that Colorado and probably the rest of the United
States differs from Sweden. Many individuals bring complaints to
Colorado's Ombudsman by personal visit, and large numbers lodge
complaints by placing a telephone call. This is an indication that
the next assembly to consider an ombudsman bill should have data
from Mr. Hogan so it can intelligently decide whether to require
that a complaint be written. Mr. Hogan's initial evaluation is that
some of the most meritorious cases come to him by the telephone.
Identity of the individuals involved with a complaint need not
be revealed by a recordation of the work being done. Ombudsmen
in other countries log a case by a numerical or alphabetical designa-
tion so that the annual report does not disclose confidences. Of
course, the agency criticized or exonerated is listed, but usually there
is no need to reveal the identity of the agency personnel involved.
The present Ombudsman's work has provided enough informa-
tion to make a preliminary and cautious evaluation. Mr. Hogan states
that about 1,325 cases have been received in the first ten months of
the undertaking, from January through October 1967. The volume
of complaints did not decrease when the assembly adjourned, as
Mr. Hogan had expected. He anticipates that it will double next
year as awareness of the service spreads.
I" Testimony before the State Affairs Committee on Feb. 28, 1967. Denver Post, Mar. 1,
1967, at 32, col. 1.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Mr. Hogan's evaluation of these cases is revealing. About forty
percent have come from citizens who have private legal problems,
and whom he has referred to their attorney or to a legal aid society.
These are the cases over which an official ombudsman would have
no jurisdiction because they do not involve complaints against gov-
ernmental agencies. Rather than refusing to recommend the appli-
cable source of assistance, Mr. Hogan has not hesitated to advise
the individual to seek legal assistance. His inclination not to turn
a deaf ear follows the pattern of the ombudsmen in other countries.'" 7
Still they handle less requests for information and legal advice than
this 88 because their public is better educated about the ombudsman
function. Mr. Hogan does not consider these cases to be requests
for information, but bona fide complaints which the individual does
not understand present a private legal question. He considers only
ten percent of his cases to have been requests for information.
The Colorado experience does reflect the widespread demand
for some sort of governmental information service; however, it is
doubtful whether that need can be met by an ombudsman. It seems
clear that information services could not be provided within the
traditional ombudsman scheme. To do so would expand the activity
of the office greatly, making a small staff and a personalistic system
unworkable.' 89 Mr. Hogan no doubt receives more than his share
of information requests because, being self-appointed, he has been
in no position to undertake a public education program. He also
feels that once one individual in need of advice is steered in the
proper direction, others become aware of this service, want it for
themselves when the need arises, and therefore request information
from his office. He is undoubtedly correct when he says that his
unofficial operation allows him wider jurisdiction than an ombuds-
man working in accordance with a statute would have.
Another forty percent of the cases received have been quickly
resolved by a few telephone calls. These involve situations con-
cerning some governmental branch, although not necessarily the
state government. Many citizens have demonstrated a marked lack
of knowledge about the responsibilities of the different levels of
government. Those complaints involving the federal government
1' E.g., the Danish Parliamentary Directives instruct the Ombudsman to take no action
on a complaint beyond his jurisdiction other than to refer it to the appropriate
authority and to give the complainant reasonable guidance. GELLHORN, supra note 9,
at 21-22.
188 Cf. GELLHORN, Supra note 9, at 134.
18 9 The need by the public for better information about administrative agency functions
has been a major criticism made by the New Zealand Ombudsman. Id. Japan has
over 9,000 Civil Liberties Commissioners who give advice to hundreds of thousands
of citizens annually about "nearly everything under the sun." Id. at 411. At least
one writer feels that an ombudsman should dispense general information about
governmental agencies as one of his primary duties. Aaron, supra note 173, at 59.
VOL. 45
COLORADO'S OMBUDSMAN OFFICE
have been referred to the appropriate federal agency, and those in-
volving the local government have been referred to the appropriate
local office. This service is an important function of the institution,
and it should become a part of any official ombudsman program in
Colorado.
That portion of this forty percent which involves state agencies
varies widely in its scope. Many complaints arise because there has
been a lack of communication between the agency and the individual.
A large share of the complainants have been given inadequate in-
formation or no explanation at all. Even though they have nego-
tiated, the agency is sometimes unable or unwilling to understand
the individual's position. In some cases the Lieutenant Governor
or his staff have mediated by locating the problem, drawing out the
pertinent facts from the citizen and providing them to the agency,
or arranging for the agency to meet again with the individual.
In one case a young couple decided to move from California
to Denver. They flew to Denver to purchase a home and returned
to California to move their personal property. They bought a motor-
cycle in California, paid a sales tax and listed their new Denver
address on the registration papers. When they brought it to Colo-
rado and applied for a Colorado certificate of title, the revenue
department insisted on collecting a sales tax for what it thought had
to be a taxable sale within the state. The two sides could not make
the other see their point. Someone told the couple that the Lieutenant
Governor was serving as an ombudsman so they contacted him. He
intervened, explained the situation to the department, and the new
Coloradans got their title without paying a double sales tax.
Another case involved a simple failure by the agency to meet
its obligations. The state brand commissioner is required to inspect
the brands of cattle shipped out of the state, and to collect a tax
for each animal as well as an additional fee for the promotion of
Colorado beef sales. The livestock owner is entitled to a refund of
the promotional fee if he chooses, but he must apply within ten days
on vouchers to be furnished by the beef board.' 9 ° One cattleman
did not receive the necessary application forms from the agency until
after the deadline had passed. He was then refused the refund.
After intervention by the Lieutenant Governor the agency supplied
the forms and paid the rancher his refund.
Other cases in this category have involved situations where the
individual went to an agency and was informed by it that they were
not the unit responsible for his problem. The agency personnel either
could not or did not refer the citizen to the proper agency. The
190Ch. 69, §§ 15, 17, [1965] Colo. Laws 253, 254.
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Lieutenant Governor has located the department and given the indi-
vidual the information.
Mr. Hogan estimates that twenty percent of the cases have been
investigated at some depth. Of these, he feels a large share have
been meritorious complaints. His efforts as an ombudsman have
usually resulted in some gain for the individual. Even in those few
cases in which he has had to tell the complainant that nothing could
be done, he feels confident they have been appreciative because they
are at least satisfied everything possible under the present state of
the law has been done. They are perhaps able to understand and
accept a decision they had previously resisted. As Mr. Hogan ex-
pressed it, they appreciate the fact that, "Passing the buck has
stopped," and that someone has told them frankly and convincingly
that nothing else can be done.
Professor Seney, speaking for the ombudsman bill before the
State Affairs Committee, said an ombudsman office inevitably would
"be a sounding board for chronic complainers," but he doubted that
such activity would "take over the office."19' Lieutenant Governor
Hogan's experience offers solid encouragement on this point. He
had expected a good many querulous complaints. After ten -months
he could classify only three instances as "crackpot" cases of the
type where "someone tells me they have been visited by little, green
men from outer space and no governmental agency will pay any
attention." His experience supports that of other ombudsmen who
rarely receive complaints indicating derangement, or complaints that
are frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith.
19 2
C. Public Reaction to Colorado's Ombudsman
Lieutenant Governor Hogan has mapped a very precarious route
for himself. It weaves through the ins and outs of Colorado politics
and between the public's desire for service in government and its
strong distaste for increased state taxation. The Denver voters, for
instance, have emphatically rejected every proposed salary increase
for elected city officials since 1951.19' The Colorado General As-
sembly, no doubt reflecting a general and sharply felt abhorrence
of increases in state spending, has almost as consistently refused to
raise the pay of elected state officials.
19 4
191 Testimony, note 186 supra.
19 E.g., GELLHORN, supra note 9, Table VII, n.a. at 119 (New Zealand).
193 Denver Post, July 10, 1967, at 14, col. 1 (editorial). This refusal to increase salaries
is all the more significant in light of the fact that salary rates average 30% to 50%
lower than most of the salary scales of U.S. cities of comparable size. Report of
Charter Salary Committee, Denver, Colorado, Mar. 14, 1966, on file in the mayor's
office.
104 Salaries of Colorado's top-ranking elected and appointed officials have been raised
substantially, effective in 1970. Ch. 318, §§ 1-2, [1967) Colo. Laws 594-95. These
salaries have remained at low levels since 1958, ch. 42, §§ 1-2, (1958] Colo. Laws
236-37, and the general assembly had refused repeatedly until 1967 to increase them.
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An editorial in the Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph mir-
rors this public opinion opposing increased spending, but surely
its almost reactionary viewpoints will not be accepted by the ma-
jority of an intelligent electorate once it has an understanding of
the ombudsman office:
"Watch it! You are in the process of being softened up for the
creation of another tax-supported, politically motivated and con-
trolled bureaucratic agency to eat out your substance." . . . [It]
would provide for "ombudsmen" - that is, more bureaucrats - to
stand between the already put upon taxpayers and the bureaucracy
itself.
[I]f, as is certainly true, "the bureaucratic maze called govern-
ment" has grown complex, baffling and forbidding, the answer,
as should be obvious to anyone of even average intelligence, is to
reduce the size, power and expense of the bureaucracy, rather than
adding to it with more full time stenographers and full time admin-
istrative assistants.
The people of Colorado need "ombudsmen" and more bureau-
cratic "special pleaders" like they need more holes in their heads.
. .. "Let the Swedes and Russians and other socialistic countries
keep their obmudsmen. We have eough troubles (and taxes) as it is
without adopting more old world socialistic ideas."'
19 5
Even political science professors, who should perhaps be better
informed than emotional editorialists of the history and traditions
of the institution, are not immune from misunderstanding. Also
testifying on behalf of the bill before the State Affairs Committee,
Dr. William Winter, Chairman of the Political Science Department
at the University of Colorado, suggested that a commission rather
than an individual should assume the duties of an ombudsman.
His reasons were that a commission " 'could represent several types
of professional orientation' and would lessen the risk that a single
ombudsman 'might go out chasing administrators just for the sake
of knocking off a few administrators.' "I" The professor's obvious
distrust ignores the strong tradition of integrity and objectivity which
ombudsmen have established everywhere they hold office. In all
the years of their service, not one ombudsman has been implicated
in scandal or any similar misuse of office. There is no reason to
believe Colorado will have a different experience. " 7
With vitriolic and misleading statements emanating from in-
fluential and eminent sources in Colorado, one would expect the
195 Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Jan. 15, 1967, at 6-D, col. 1.
198 Testimony before the State Affairs Committee of the Colorado House of Representa-
tives on Feb. 28, 1967. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1967 at 3 col 1 See text at note 134
supra for an argument against a plural ombudsman for Colorado.
197 Professor Winter's apprehension is similar to that expressed in an editorial in the
Denver Post entitled, "Who'll Watch the Watcher." It suggests, perhaps facetiously,
that "we might within a decade be hearing that we need some ombudsman-watchers."
Denver Post, Feb. 9, 1967, at 14, col. 8.
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Lieutenant Governor to tread warily. He has done just that. He
has not sought the publicity which the public must have to under-
stand and to support the institution. He has not advocated that the
legislature accept the ombudsman bills. Right now his ombudsman
experience leaves him convinced that his work is essential. "One
hundred percent of these cases present work which ought to be done.
But how it should be done, who should do it, where the office should
fit in, and whether it can be done economically are questions about
which I'm no longer so sure." Mr. Hogan gives the impression that
he still feels an ombudsman could effectively work out of the lieu-
tenant governor's office, and that it would have the advantage of
not requiring another officer on the public payroll, nor requiring
another office and equipment. It probably would necessitate funds
for a full time secretary and an administrative assistant.
If constitutional amendment number one on the 1968 ballot
is approved by the people of Colorado, the offices of governor and
lieutenant governor will be unified politically. Each party's choices
for the top two seats will either stand or fall together at the polls.
Then the lieutenant governor would not be a stranger in his own
administration. While Mr. Hogan realizes that a lieutenant gov-
ernor might under those circumstances become a full working part-
ner of the governor, he entertains some belief that the additional
duties of an ombudsman could also be assumed.
With political traps lying all about him, the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor is in no position to advocate that Colorado create an ombuds-
man in its traditional sense. "If the choice was between spending
$50,000 for an ombudsman," he said, "or for education, I would
not have to hesitate to choose education." Still he is convinced that
the work must be done by someone, and he is determined to fulfill
that responsibility for the remaining three years of his term.
The lesson seems clear. The ombudsman institution must re-
main above party politics or it cannot perform its functions. Inter-
meshed with politics, it would not be able to retain the trust of the
people, the news media or the legislature. Mr. Hogan is not naive;
he says his primary concern is in improving government for the
people, but he admits that doing this work well can help him in
his political career. However, it would not be accurate or fair to say
that his work so far has involved partisan politics. For instance, he
has not tried to exert his influence to gain favors for his clientele.
He has made it a practice to approach an agency with respect for
its own expertise and procedures. He asks what the criteria are and
whether the individual has met those standards. Then he evaluates




In at least one case he was able to bring about a change in
statute. A Canadian driving a diesel equipped Mercedes-Benz stopped
in northeastern Colorado to fill his tank with fuel. The gasoline
station could not sell him diesel fuel because he had not purchased
the tax stamps from the state police. He could not understand why
the stations could not sell the stamps directly so the station man-
ager referred him to the Lieutenant Governor. Mr. Hogan agreed.
After discovering that the state police saw no merit in having to
leave their patrol to collect taxes, he persuaded the assembly to tack
an amendment on to a pending road bill. The bill was enacted and
the change was made within the week. By then the Canadian was
out of state, probably never to return. The incident is also some
indication that the work so far has not been politically oriented1" 8
because a Canadian has no vote in Colorado.
Mr. Hogan has received some constituent casework from the
legislature. The members have no personal staff, and they are not
in session long enough to handle many constituent complaints. Mr.
Hogan does what he can to resolve problems and then replies di-
rectly to the individual citizen, being careful to mention the legis-
lator's name.
There are some disturbing features of Mr. Hogan's ombuds-
man function. First, no matter how earnestly any elected official
serving as an ombudsman tries to prevent it, his very party affiliation
injects some degree of politics into the institution. This is precisely
what must be avoided if the office is to succeed as it should.
Secondly, a crippled mutation of the ombudsman institution is
being presented to the public. Colorado now has a blend of the
traditional ombudsman and the traditional caseworking politician.
The present unofficial function cannot receive the widespread edu-
cational publicity an official ombudsman should have. Therefore,
misconceptions about the office are no doubt gaining currency, and
increasingly so because the volume of complaints is growing as
awareness of the office spreads.
Third, the present ombudsman perhaps conceives of his func-
tion too narrowly. He has concentrated more on getting results in
a particular case rather than in improving procedure statewide be-
cause his unofficial status does not authorize him to supervise state-
wide. The latter function has not been ignored, however. One case
serves as a good example. A lady complained that the instructions
on the cosmetology licensing examination were so unclear as to
prevent a fair test. While Mr. Hogan was investigating he dis-
covered that two tests were kept on file. One battery was for Cau-
198 Mr. Hogan discounted political motivations in an earlier account of his work.
Denver Post, Mar. 27, 1967, at 13, col. 1.
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casians and the other was reserved for minority groups. He referred
the matter to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission which had no
difficulty in ending the discrimination.199
Fourth, the lack of a staff and the demands of his other duties
require Mr. Hogan to forego personal supervision of many cases.
While difficult or important cases get his attention, his adminis-
trative assistant and his volunteer workers frequently handle all
aspects of a complaint. This situation raises the possibility that no
one person will notice complaints which present a recurring problem,
all of which could be resolved by correcting the root of the trouble.
Fifth, the present investigation procedure cannot be thorough
enough to command universal respect for its accuracy. Usually the
official file is not examined, because there is no power to compel
its submission and because Mr. Hogan fully appreciates his un-
official status. It is too easy for an agency in possession of all the
facts to explain away the complaint when there is no independent
and unbiased examination.
There are some heartening aspects at the same time. The Colo-
rado institution has not slipped measurably into partisan politics.
The ombudsman bill had bipartisan support; the house bill was
offered by a Republican and the senate bill was proposed by two
Democrats.
The Lieutenant Governor's assumption of the role has clothed
the institution with the aura of high office which it must have. If
the second ranking official in the state has served the people well,
the office benefits from a tradition of prestige which should carry
over to an official ombudsman. Mr. Hogan and his staff have
demonstrated a real personal interest in the citizens who come to
the ombudsman. Mr. Hogan reports that it is not easy day after day
to hear complaints with sympathetic understanding, but realizing
that it is essential, he has done so. He is thus doing much to estab-
lish the traditions and the public trust in the office that it will need
in any official form.
D. Predictions
Many of the arguments which can be made against establishing
an official ombudsman office in Colorado have already taken form.
The most extreme reaction has come from the Colorado Springs
Gazette Telegraph which decried the concept as socialistic. 200 It
described the office as politically motivated and politically controlled,
199 Interview with J. David Penwell, Assistant Attorney General and Legal Counsel,
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, in Denver, Oct. 25, 1967.
200 Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Jan. 3, 1967, at 7-B, col. 1; id., Jan. 15, 1967,
at 6-D, col. 1.
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an intolerable appendage to big government which would only make
it bigger and more arrogant, and an inexcusable tax burden.
The Denver Post doubted the need for "a whole new ... layer
of government" since "state administration has been relatively re-
sponsive to the needs of the people .... 201 It suggested that an
effective press and an alert minority party leadership could ade-
quately safeguard the public's interest in good government. Another
Post editorial expressed fear that an ombudsman would only become
a "partisan fault-finder."2 °2 Besides, it argued, Americans are chronic
gripers, so no individual could handle the volume of unnecessary
complaints which would inevitably flow once the floodgates were
opened.
Other arguments against adopting an ombudsman office could
be made. It probably will be said that one man and a small staff
cannot do enough to affect the totality of administrative govern-
ment. It could be argued that there should be no "one man law-
giver," and the courts or administrative tribunals should interpret
all statutes and rules. The majority of the public probably could be
persuaded that administrative problems only plague the poor who
do not know how to deal effectively with agencies, and that the
indigent can go to a legal aid society for help. It could be said
that, all other arguments aside, the effort would not be worth-
while because the complaints are simply too minor and petty to
present a real problem.
Most of these arguments have already been answered in the
preceding material, and that discussion need not be repeated. The
unanswered doubts deserve comment. Colorado administration ad-
mittedly has been relatively responsive to the public need. Mr. Hogan
feels strongly that Colorado has a good administrative service,20 '
but even a conscientious public administration contains problems
and red tape as his present workload shows.
The press has long since been unable to uncover administrative
abuse,20 ' and the legislature's inability to do so has already been
discussed. 20 5 Mr. Hogan's examples show that serious shortcomings
have been corrected through his complaint system. Those same prob-
201 Denver Post, Feb. 9, 1967, at 14, col. 8.
202 Denver Post, Mar. 4, 1966, at 24, col. 1.
203 Interview, supra note 181. The institution could not be successful unless the state
was already reasonably well administered. Criticism would have no good effect
where the government was riddled with corruption or where officials did not worry
about public chastisement. See Rowat & Liambias, Canada, in THE OMBUDSMAN
186, 188 (D. Rowat ed. 1965); Northey, New Zealand's Parliamentary Commis-
sioner, id. 127 at 142-43.
24 Abrahamson, Ireland, in THE OMBUDSMAN 201, 203 (D. Rowat ed. 1965); Nader,
Ombudsmen or State Governments, in THE OMBUDSMAN 240, 244 (D. Rowat ed.
1965).
205 See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
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lems had existed long before his program began, yet the press and
the legislators were not aware of them. Even the individuals affected
by the discriminatory cosmetology examination did not realize their
rights were being violated. Only an independent investigator will
be able to uncover this sort of abuse.
The General Assembly of Colorado has shown its determination
to avoid partisanship in any ombudsman office it creates. With that
sort of backing, it is hard to believe a Colorado ombudsman would
overthrow all the traditions established elsewhere and here to be-
come a partisan fault-finder. By the same token, Mr. Hogan's ex-
perience in Colorado shows that Americans are not chronic com-
plainers of the type who would flood the ombudsman with petty
complaints.
No one has as yet attacked the ombudsman idea as an enemy
of the civil service, but that will be forthcoming. It is an accusation
which has been leveled in every country which has recently adopted
the institution. Yet the public employees have invariably found the
ombudsman their friend. Statistics already presented show he has
exonerated them from charges in the great majority of cases rather
than casting blame and disrepute upon them.
20 6
Funding the office is a real problem. On one hand, $50,000
or $60,000 is a small part of the state budget; it is insignificant com-
pared to the cost of operating Colorado's court system. On the other
hand, any allocation of state funds should not be made lightly.
Colorado can rely on Mr. Hogan's ombudsman work to provide the
answer to whether or not this expenditure should be made. It could
be that the office would save the state as much as it would cost by
decreasing the number of cases litigated in the courts and before the
administrative agencies.
If the unofficial ombudsman's work continues to produce favor-
able results it will generate a widespread public expectation in Colo-
rado that the service be continued after Mr. Hogan's four years in
office are ended.20 7 There will no doubt still be strong opposition
so that a governor is likely at first to appoint his second in command
or an administrative aide to fulfill the function. But before too long
the need for a Colorado ombudsman will be documented from the
206 The New Zealand public service reacted strongly against the proposal for an
ombudsman, fearing that it would be victimized as his scapegoat. A few years of
experience with the Ombudsman has persuaded the public service that he has been
an impartial friend and defender rather than an enemy. GELLHORN, supra note 9,
at 91-93. See also Os, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 95,
96 (D. Rowat ed. 1965). Pedersen, Denmark's Ombudsman, in THE OMBUDSMAN
75, 77 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
207 The public's overt response to the ombudsman proposals has been favorable without
exception. For citizen reactions, see these letters to the editor printed in the Denver
Post, Feb. 21, 1967, at 27, col. 1; id., Apr. 16, 1967 ("Perspective" section), at 5,
col. 2; id., July 20, 1967, at 19, col. 2.
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data which should be collected, and eventually a traditional om-
budsman will be.instituted.20 8  We can only hope that the, present
conception of the office will not prejudice that possibility by be-
coming a poliJtical.gimmick or by accustoming.the people to a heavily
diluted perversion of the concept. In the final analysis the view
adopted by the Denver Post will no doubt prove accurate:
Undoubtedly there will be great lethargy and some resistance, per-
haps years of delay. But this idea eventually will prevail and then,
after a few years, the-people of Colorado will ask themselves how
they got along all that time without an ombudsman.
20 9
Loren L. Mall
208 It is probable that Denver will create an ombudsman office before the state does.
Mayor Tom Currigan said in his second inaugural address on July 3, 1967, that he
would propose soon to the Denver City Council that it establish the post for city
and county government. Denver Post, July 3, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
209 Denver Post, Feb. 7, 1967, at 14, col. 1 (editorial).
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